CANADIAN ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS REGARDING IMMIGRATION: RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL PER CAPITA IMMIGRATION AND OTHER CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Executive Summary

by
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for
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The opinions and interpretations expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Citizenship & Immigration Canada.

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Some key findings

How do levels policy decisions, determining the number of immigrants who come to Canada each year, affect Canadians' attitudes and perceptions related to immigration? Do higher or lower rates of immigration affect public attitudes to any meaningful extent or are such attitudes and perceptions only really determined by factors like the state of the economy or the individual's age or level of education? To what extent do levels policy decisions affect policy support? And what about their effect on attitudes that will promote or impede the integration process through their expression in behaviour toward immigrants? An examination of Canadians' attitudes and perceptions related to immigration, within their regional and historical context, while not providing definitive answers to all these questions, does enable at least some tentative conclusions.

Rates of immigration

In any attempt to examine levels policy effects, obviously the key contextual factor is the rate of immigration. By relating year-to-year or regional variations in that rate to analogous variations in attitudes and perceptions, we can look for evidence of parallel changes that would suggest a linkage between them.

The most commonly provided statistics describing the rate of immigration, the total number of immigrants landed or the per cent of that total destined for a given region, are inappropriate for our purposes because they fail to consider changes over time or regional differences in total population. For example, recent years have seen 50 to 55% of newcomers settling in Ontario and just over 20% going to British Columbia, supporting an impression that the rate for Ontario is over twice the rate for British Columbia. Adjusting those figures to reflect the respective population sizes of the two regions, shows that the rate for British Columbia is actually substantially greater than that for Ontario. Similarly, the immigration totals of 194,000 in 1951 and 193,000 in 1989 obviously represent very different rates of immigration when considered in the context of Canada's population at those respective points in time -- 14 million versus 26 million.

While the usual unadjusted statistics are appropriate for purposes such as allocating expenditures on settlement programs, where the key element is the number of new immigrants being helped, the adjusted numbers are more appropriate when examining any effects on the attitudes of existing residents.

Regional rates

Figure A shows the rate of immigration proportional to national and regional population size for the period from 1969 to 1998.

Among the things to be noted from this figure are: (1) the national rate of immigration was lower from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s than it was during the earlier part of the 1970s and over the period covering the end of the 1980s and all of the 1990s; (2) over the three decades, Ontario and British Columbia consistently experienced substantially greater per capita rates of immigration than did other regions (except for Alberta, which experienced equally high rates between 1976 and 1986); (3) these regional differences are more marked in the years when the national rate is relatively high -- that is, when the level has gone up, the regional imbalance has increased; and (4) since the national rate has been relatively high for the most recent ten years, the regional imbalance has been consistently greater over that period than during the preceding ten-year period.

So, historically, the dispersion of new immigrants across the country has been uneven and in recent years has become more so. By implication, to the extent that the effects of immigration are felt more strongly in the regions in which new immigrants settle, differential levels policy effects should be discernible on both social and economic dimensions, and those effects should be of a greater magnitude in Ontario and British Columbia than elsewhere in the country. And, if anything, those differences should be more marked over the more recent years than during the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s.

Figure A: Per capita immigration flow by region, 1969-1998.



While this may be stating the obvious with respect to the effects of immigration on indices such as regional population growth and regional demand for goods and services of various kinds (after adjustment for internal migration), it is perhaps less obvious when we enter the realm of public opinion. Various survey results suggest public knowledge of immigration matters falls far short of ideal levels. Also, attitudes and perceptions regarding immigration may be as much a question of factors like racism or economic security as they are a function of experiencing the effects of immigration. Thus, it is not a forgone conclusion that we will find regional differences on those dimensions that correspond to regional variations in the magnitude of the inflow of new immigrants. In other words, we might find that residents of Ontario and British Columbia, where the majority of new immigrants are settling, because of that fact are more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants coming, compared to those living elsewhere; on the other hand, we might find that the opposite is true and that residents of other regions are more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants, perhaps out of relatively greater levels of prejudice or economic insecurity.

Regional attitudes

Table "A" shows a six-region breakdown of the country, ordered according to the per capita rate of immigration over the 1995-97 period. As well as the regional population and immigration statistics, the table also shows the results for two questions asked in a series of ten Angus Reid surveys over the 1996-98 period. (Survey results are combined to increase the reliability of the regional estimates.)

With respect to levels policy support, we see that residents of the regions to which the rate of immigration is greatest are substantially more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants coming to Canada and slightly less likely to say there are "too few", compared to the residents of other regions. Regarding perceptions of effects on the community, there are substantially greater tendencies to perceive negative effects in the regions with the greatest per capita immigration rates but almost no differences in the reporting of positive effects.

Table A. Per capita immigration flow, attitude towards levels policy and perceived effect of immigration on the community, by region (combined results of Angus Reid surveys from January 1996 to October 1998).

Region	% of pop.	% of flow	flow per 100 pop.	% saying too many immigrants	% saying too few immigrants	% saying negative effect	% saying positive effect	sample size
British Columbia	12.9	21.9	1.30	47	6	25	44	(1942)
Ontario	37.3	54.1	1.11	45	7	20	44	(5733)
Alberta	9.4	6.3	.51	43	7	18	45	(1372)
Quebec	24.7	13.0	.40	39	8	19	47	(3868)
Manitoba & Sask.	7.3	2.5	.27	37	11	14	44	(1094)
Atlantic prov.	8.1	2.3	.20	39	9	14	39	(1255)
Canada	100.0	100.0	.77	42	8	19	44	(15265)
f-values:				17.15***	4.42***	10.40***	2.44*	

Note. Population data from Statistics Canada. Immigration data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada for 1995-97.

F-values test the statistical significance of regional variation: * $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$.

Survey questions: "In your opinion, do you feel that there are too many, too few or about the right number of immigrants coming to Canada?" and "In general, what effect does immigration to this country have on your community?"

So, the current survey data strongly suggest that the uneven regional distribution of the current immigration flow leads to differential levels policy effects on public attitudes and perceptions: Opposition to immigration and perceptions of negative effects of immigration on the community are more prevalent in regions receiving higher rates of immigration. Is this a new development, resulting from recent increases in the imbalance of settlement patterns in conjunction with the prolonged effects of the 1990s recession?

The historical database suggests that the less marked but still uneven distribution of the immigration flow in the 1980s was accompanied by partially similar regional differences in levels policy support: when we look at earlier survey results, compared to the residents of other regions, British Columbia residents showed consistently weaker levels policy support and Ontario residents did likewise at the beginning of the 1980s.

However, Ontario residents showed stronger support than other regions during the economic boom of the later part of that decade. But, the recent surveys, up to the point of surveys in late 1998 and early 1999, show the improving employment picture in Ontario has not resulted in the elimination of the deficit in levels policy support there, relative to other regions with lower per capita immigration rates. This suggests that the higher levels and greater unevenness of settlement patterns in the 1990s may be hindering a replication of the rapprochement between Ontario and those regions which occurred in the late 1980s.

Underlying factors

Recent surveys provide some information about the dynamics underlying the relative weakness in levels policy support in the major immigrant-receiving regions.

First, the results suggest that it is not a case of just among the Canadian-born residents of those regions that levels policy support is relatively weak. Members of the immigrant communities in those regions also show less support for levels policy than do their counterparts in other regions (though, in almost all regions, levels policy support is stronger among those born outside the country than among those born in Canada).

As well, the current data suggest that perceptions in the major immigrant-receiving regions are not less favourable regarding the effects of immigration on employment opportunities or on culture, compared to other regions. Immigrant respondents have more favourable perceptions of those effects than do survey respondents born in Canada and, because they comprise a greater proportion of the populations in the major immigrant-receiving regions, overall such perceptions are actually more favourable there than in other regions.

Further analyses suggest that it is not just a greater awareness of exactly how many immigrants are coming but that the differences in levels policy support are more related to concerns about issues such as crime, refugee determination, fulfilment of sponsorship obligations, population growth and the earlier-mentioned overall effects on the community. On such measures, we find evidence of greater levels of concern in the major immigrant-receiving regions than elsewhere, results which parallel the pattern of regional differences in levels policy support. In other words, rather than perceptions of general effects of immigration on the economy or culture, greater perceptions of problematic effects of a more community-specific nature appear to underlie the weaker support for levels policy in the regions with greater per capita immigration rates.

Can we specify the exact relation between the rate of immigration and the occurrence of negative effects on levels policy support and other attitudes and perceptions? Briefly, no or, at least, not yet. There is some suggestion that there may be a threshold of a regional per capita rate somewhere in the range of 0.5% to 1.0% before negative effects start to appear but, at this point in time, this is only a reasoned guess. Moreover, our analyses suggest this threshold would rise and fall as a function of economic conditions and other factors which affect attitudes and perceptions related to immigration. And, more importantly, further research is required to establish with greater certainty that the regional differences in the rate of immigration are the true cause of these relative weaknesses in levels policy support and that those effects are mediated by the above-mentioned more community-specific perceptions. One of the key needs in this respect is for broader-based surveys of immigration issues, surveys that cover the full range of perceptions and concerns which may be important determinants of levels policy support.

Attitudes toward immigrants

The relation between regional per capita flow rates and levels policy support, while, of course, being important with respect to its influence on subsequent decisions regarding that policy and communications issues surrounding it, need not have direct implications for immigrant integration -- attitudes towards a government policy on immigration are not necessarily the same as attitudes towards immigrants as people.

Analyses of the relation between immigration flow rates and the attitudes towards immigrants -- attitudes that will directly affect integration -- are limited by the scarcity of data on these attitudes. The results do suggest a negative relation occurred during the onset of the recession in the early 1990s, implying that levels policy decisions at that time may have contributed to an increase in prejudice in the regions in which the flow was most concentrated. The quality of the database regarding attitudes towards immigrants does not suffice, however, to make firm conclusions in this regard.

Given that the sparse data that are available suggest levels policy can have an impact on the level of racism present in the major immigrant-receiving communities, the need for better data on attitudes towards immigrants is pressing. Only data of this nature will enable confirmation and specification of that relation and, as a result, inform future policy decisions with respect to what combination of decisions, in the areas of levels policy and policies involving prejudice-reducing initiatives, is necessary to avoid such untoward policy consequences.

Summary

We see distinct differences between the major immigrant-receiving regions and those to which relatively few current immigrants go, differences that become more strongly evident when the analysis removes the masking influence of the greater immigrant presence in the former communities. When we look at the immigrant and Canadian-born populations separately, we see a clear influence of the uneven regional distribution of the immigration flow on attitudes and perceptions in both. Weaker levels policy support is found in regions where the flow is concentrated, a relative weakness that cannot be accounted for by perceptions of effects in the

areas of employment or culture and runs contrary to the pattern that educational and age differences would predict.

The results on other measures suggest that, while this may to some extent reflect different perceptions regarding the current rate of immigration, estimates of the actual numbers play a limited role in determining levels policy preferences and that regional differences in factors such as beliefs about the desirability of population growth and concerns regarding issues such as refugee determination, fulfilment of sponsorship obligations and immigrant criminality are more important. This, of course, fits well with the fact that there is much greater media coverage of any problems associated with these program areas in the regions where more current immigrants settle.

These analyses suggest the uneven distribution of the immigration flow has produced differential levels policy effects on several aspects of public opinion related to immigration. And, nowhere is this more the case than in Vancouver where the rapid rate of social change due to recent immigration appears to have had marked effects on attitudes and perceptions. Levels policy support continues to be relatively weak in that city and its residents continue to be among the most likely in the country to report that immigration has had a negative effect on their community. The most recent surveys do show a significant trend toward increasing levels policy support, including among residents of Vancouver and other major immigrant-receiving regions. But, as of mid-1999, the positive effects of the economic recovery have not been sufficient to fully counteract the negative effects, in those regions, of the higher recent flow rates.

The overall conclusions suggested by these results are: (a) higher rates of immigration are associated with decreased support for levels policy; (b) that relation is moderated by economic conditions; (c) in recent years, in the major immigrant-receiving regions, the positive effects on levels policy support due to improving economic conditions have not been strong enough to counteract the negative effects due to relatively high rates of immigration; and (d) while data scarcity prevents firm conclusions regarding attitudes toward immigrants that will impact directly on integration success, results do suggest possible negative levels policy effects on them as well, underlining the urgency of collecting better data on those attitudes.

Table 4. Proportion of total population, proportion of total 1995-97 immigration flow, flow per capita, proportion of Canadian-born in population, flow per capita Canadian-born, and flow per capita foreign-born, by region.

	% total pop	% 95-97 flow	flow per 100 total pop	% c-b in pop	flow per 100 c-b pop	flow per 100 f-b pop
Toronto	15.1	44.1	2.24	58	3.86	5.33
Vancouver	6.6	19.3	2.24	65	3.45	6.40
Combined	21.7	63.4	2.24	60	3.73	5.60
Montreal	11.6	10.4	.69	82	.84	3.83
Alta urban	5.9	5.5	.71	80	.89	3.55
Ont urban	12.5	5.0	.31	81	.38	1.63
Ont rural	10.2	5.0	.38	89	.43	3.45
B.C rural	5.1	2.2	.33	86	.38	2.36
Combined	45.3	28.1	.47	83	.63	2.76
Major 7	67.0	91.5	1.05	76	1.38	4.38
Other	33.0	8.5	.20	95	.21	4.00
Canada	100.0	100.0	.77	83.4	.92	4.64

ATTITUDES ET PERCEPTIONS DES CANADIENS CONCERNANT L'IMMIGRATION : LIENS AVEC LE TAUX D'IMMIGRATION RÉGIONAL PAR HABITANT ET D'AUTRES FACTEURS CONTEXTUELS

Résumé

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pour
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Les opinions et les interprétations exprimées dans le présent document sont celles de l'auteur et ne reflètent pas nécessairement le point de vue de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada.

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Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada
Politique, planification et recherche stratégiques
Canada

Quelques constatations importantes

En quoi les décisions relatives aux niveaux d'immigration, qui déterminent le nombre d'immigrants admis au Canada chaque année, influent-elles sur les attitudes et les perceptions des Canadiens face à l'immigration? Des taux d'immigration élevés ou faibles ont-ils des répercussions marquées sur l'attitude du public? ou bien ces attitudes et ces perceptions sont-elles en réalité déterminées uniquement par des facteurs comme la situation économique, l'âge de la personne interrogée ou son niveau d'instruction? Dans quelle mesure les décisions relatives aux niveaux d'immigration ont-elles une incidence sur l'appui de la population envers la politique d'immigration? Et quelles sont leurs répercussions sur les attitudes qui favorisent ou entravent le processus d'intégration, c'est-à-dire sur les comportements envers les immigrants? Un examen des attitudes et des perceptions des Canadiens face à l'immigration, s'inscrivant dans un contexte régional et historique, même s'il ne fournit pas une réponse définitive à toutes ces questions, permet au moins d'en arriver à certaines conclusions provisoires.

Taux d'immigration

Lorsque l'on tente d'étudier les répercussions de la politique des niveaux d'immigration, il est évident que le principal facteur contextuel est le taux d'immigration. En reliant les variations annuelles ou régionales de ce taux aux variations analogues constatées dans les attitudes et les perceptions, on peut vérifier l'existence de changements parallèles qui montreraient que les deux phénomènes sont en corrélation.

Les statistiques le plus souvent utilisées pour décrire le taux d'immigration, c'est-à-dire le nombre total d'immigrants admis ou le pourcentage de ce nombre qui se dirige vers une région donnée, ne sont pas pertinentes aux fins de notre recherche puisqu'elles ne prennent pas en considération les changements qui surviennent avec le temps ni les différences régionales dans la population totale. Par exemple, au cours des dernières années, de 50 à 55 % des nouveaux arrivants se sont établis en Ontario, et seulement un peu plus de 20 % se sont installés en Colombie-Britannique, ce qui donne l'impression que le taux d'immigration pour l'Ontario est le double de celui de la Colombie-Britannique. Mais si l'on redresse ces chiffres en fonction de la taille de la population de ces deux régions, on remarque que le taux d'immigration de la Colombie-Britannique est en réalité beaucoup plus élevé que celui de

l'Ontario. De même, le nombre d'immigrants total, qui était de 194 000 en 1951 et de 193 000 en 1989, représente un taux d'immigration très différent selon qu'on le compare à la population du Canada en 1951 (14 millions) ou en 1989 (26 millions).

Les statistiques non rajustées, utilisées habituellement, conviennent lorsqu'il s'agit d'affecter des fonds aux programmes d'établissement, où l'élément le plus important est le nombre de nouveaux immigrants aidés; mais l'utilisation de statistiques rajustées est plus indiquée lorsqu'on étudie l'incidence de l'immigration sur les attitudes des résidents.

Taux régionaux

Le graphique A montre le taux d'immigration en proportion de la population nationale et des populations régionales pour la période de 1969 à 1998.

Ce graphique permet de tirer certaines conclusions, entre autres : 1) le taux national d'immigration était plus bas entre la fin des années 70 et le milieu des années 80 qu'au début des années 70 et à la fin des années 80 ainsi que dans les années 90; 2) au cours de ces 30 années, l'Ontario et la Colombie-Britannique ont toujours connu des taux d'immigration par habitant plus élevés que les autres régions (à l'exception de l'Alberta, qui a elle aussi enregistré des taux élevés entre 1976 et 1986); 3) ces différences régionales sont plus marquées pour les années où le taux national est relativement élevé — en d'autres termes, lorsque le niveau a augmenté, le déséquilibre régional s'est accru; et 4) comme le taux national est demeuré relativement élevé au cours des dix dernières années, le déséquilibre régional a été de façon constante plus important au cours de cette période que pendant les dix années précédentes.

Ainsi, historiquement, la répartition des nouveaux immigrants au pays n'a jamais été égale; cette inégalité s'est d'ailleurs accentuée au cours des dernières années. C'est pourquoi, dans la mesure où les répercussions de l'immigration sont ressenties plus

Graphique A. Taux d'immigration par habitant selon la région, 1969-1999



fortement dans les régions où les nouveaux immigrants s'établissent, les différents effets des politiques relatives aux niveaux d'immigration devraient être perceptibles sur le plan tant social qu'économique, et se faire davantage sentir en Ontario et en Colombie-Britannique qu'ailleurs au pays. Par ailleurs, ces différences devraient être plus marquées au cours des dernières années qu'à la fin des années 70 et que pendant la première moitié des années 80.

Même si cela semble évident pour ce qui est des répercussions de l'immigration sur des indices comme la croissance de la population régionale et les besoins régionaux en biens et en services divers (après rajustement pour tenir compte des migrations internes), ce peut être moins évident lorsque nous pénétrons dans le domaine de l'opinion publique. Divers résultats de sondages laissent croire que la connaissance qu'a la population des questions d'immigration est bien loin de ce qu'elle devrait être idéalement. De plus, les attitudes et les perceptions concernant l'immigration pourraient être tout autant liées à d'autres facteurs, comme le racisme ou la sécurité économique, puisqu'elles sont fonction de la façon dont sont vécus les effets de l'immigration. C'est pourquoi il est loin d'être certain que nous observerons entre les régions des différences correspondant aux variations régionales du nombre de nouveaux immigrants accueillis. En d'autres termes, nous pourrions constater que les résidents de l'Ontario et de la Colombie-Britannique, provinces où la majorité des nouveaux immigrants s'établissent, sont plus susceptibles, pour cette raison même, de dire qu'il y a « trop » d'immigrants qui arrivent, comparativement aux résidents des autres provinces. Par contre, nous pourrions constater que l'inverse est aussi vrai et que les résidents d'autres régions sont davantage susceptibles de dire qu'il y a « trop » d'immigrants, peut-être en raison de préjugés relativement plus importants ou d'une plus grande insécurité économique.

Attitudes régionales

Le tableau A montre une répartition pour six régions du pays, classées selon le taux d'immigration par habitant pendant la période 1995-1997. En plus de la population régionale et des statistiques en matière d'immigration, le tableau présente les résultats de deux questions posées dans une série de dix sondages Angus Reid effectués au cours de la période s'étendant de 1996 à 1998. (Les résultats des sondages sont combinés pour accroître la fiabilité des estimations régionales.)

En ce qui a trait au soutien accordé à la politique des niveaux d'immigration, nous constatons que les résidents des régions où les taux d'immigration sont les plus élevés sont beaucoup plus susceptibles de dire qu'il y a « trop » d'immigrants qui arrivent au Canada et légèrement moins susceptibles de dire qu'il y en a « trop peu », comparativement aux résidents des autres régions. Au chapitre de la perception des répercussions sur la collectivité, dans les régions où le taux d'immigration par habitant est le plus élevé, la tendance à percevoir des effets négatifs est sensiblement plus grande, mais il n'y a presque aucune différence dans la perception d'effets positifs.

Ainsi, les données actuelles recueillies par sondage laissent fortement croire que la répartition inégale, entre les régions, du mouvement d'immigration actuel engendre des attitudes et des perceptions différentes dans la population. L'opposition à l'immigration et la perception de répercussions négatives sur la collectivité sont plus courantes dans les régions connaissant un taux élevé d'immigration. Ce phénomène est-il nouveau? Découle-t-il de l'augmentation récente du déséquilibre dans la répartition des immigrants conjuguée aux effets prolongés de la récession des années 1990?

Tableau A. Taux d'immigration par habitant, attitude face à la politique relative aux niveaux d'immigration et répercussions perçues de l'immigration sur la collectivité, par région (résultats combinés de sondages Angus Reid effectués entre janvier 1996 et octobre 1998).

Région	% de la pop.	% du nombre d'imm.	Nombre d'imm. Par 100 habitants	% affirmant qu'il y a trop d'immigrants	% affirmant qu'il y a trop peu d'immigrants	% affirmant qu'il y a des effets négatifs	% affirmant qu'il y a des effets positifs	Taille de l'échantillon
Colombie-Britannique	12.9	21,9	1,30	47	6	25	44	(1942)
Ontario	37,3	54,1	1,11	45	7	20	44	(5733)
Alberta	9,4	6,3	,51	43	7	18	45	(1372)
Québec	24,7	13,0	,40	39	8	19	47	(3868)
Manitoba et Sask.	7,3	2,5	,27	37	11	14	44	(1094)
Provinces maritimes	8,1	2,3	,20	39	9	14	39	(1255)
Canada	100,0	100,0	,77	42	8	19	44	(15265)
Valeurs-f				17,15***	4,42***	10,40***	2,44*	

Nota : Données sur la population fournies par Statistique Canada. Données sur l'immigration fournies par Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada pour 1995-1997.

Les valeurs-f constituent un test de signification statistique des variations régionales : * $p < 0,05$; *** $p < 0,001$.

Questions du sondage : « À votre avis, croyez-vous qu'il y a trop, trop peu ou juste le bon nombre d'immigrants qui entrent au Canada? » et « En général, quelle répercussion l'immigration a-t-elle sur votre collectivité? »

La base de données historiques semble indiquer que le déséquilibre moins marqué, mais néanmoins présent, de la répartition des immigrants dans les années 1980 s'accompagnait de différences régionales partiellement correspondantes quant au soutien manifesté pour la politique des niveaux : lorsque nous étudions les résultats de sondages antérieurs, nous constatons que, comparativement aux résidents des autres régions, les résidents de la Colombie-Britannique ont toujours affiché un appui moindre envers les politiques d'immigration, tout comme les résidents de l'Ontario au début des années 1980.

Toutefois, les résidents de l'Ontario ont appuyé plus fermement l'immigration que ceux des autres régions pendant la période de prospérité économique de la fin des années 1980. Par contre, les sondages récents, de la fin de 1998 jusqu'au début de 1999, montrent que l'amélioration de la situation de l'emploi en Ontario n'a pas permis d'éliminer la différence constatée dans cette province quant au soutien accordé à la politique d'immigration, comparativement aux autres régions où le taux d'immigration par habitant est moins élevé. Cela laisse croire qu'un taux d'immigration plus élevé et un plus grand déséquilibre dans la répartition des immigrants au cours des années 1990 pourraient empêcher que l'Ontario ne se rapproche de nouveau des autres régions, comme cela s'est produit à la fin des années 80.

Facteurs sous-jacents

Des sondages récents renseignent dans une certaine mesure sur les raisons profondes de la faiblesse, relative, du soutien manifesté pour la politique des niveaux dans les régions à forte immigration.

Tout d'abord, ces sondages révèlent que les résidents de ces régions qui sont nés au Canada ne sont pas les seuls à accorder un faible appui à la politique des niveaux. Les membres des communautés d'immigrants y sont aussi moins favorables que leurs homologues des autres régions (cependant, dans presque toutes les régions, les personnes nées à l'extérieur du Canada appuient davantage les niveaux d'immigration que les personnes nées au Canada).

De plus, les données actuelles semblent indiquer que les perceptions, dans les régions qui reçoivent le plus d'immigrants, ne sont pas moins favorables que dans les autres régions en ce qui

touche les répercussions de l'immigration sur les perspectives d'emploi ou la culture. Les répondants qui sont eux-mêmes immigrants ont une opinion plus favorable de ces répercussions que les personnes nées au Canada et, comme ils forment une proportion plus grande de la population dans les régions à forte immigration ces perceptions sont, de façon générale, plus favorables dans ces régions qu'ailleurs au pays.

Des analyses plus poussées nous amènent à croire que les différences constatées dans le soutien de la politique des niveaux tiennent moins au fait que les gens connaissent le nombre exact des immigrants qui arrivent qu'aux inquiétudes soulevées par certaines questions comme la criminalité, la détermination du statut de réfugié, le respect des obligations de parrainage, la croissance de la population et, comme on le mentionnait plus tôt, les répercussions générales sur la collectivité. Ces chiffres nous permettent de déceler un niveau d'inquiétude plus élevé dans les régions qui reçoivent beaucoup d'immigrants; et ces résultats correspondent aux différences régionales observées relativement au soutien dont bénéficie la politique des niveaux d'immigration. Autrement dit, plutôt qu'une perception globale des répercussions générales de l'immigration sur l'économie ou la culture, c'est une perception plus aiguë des répercussions problématiques, spécifiques à une collectivité donnée, qui semble expliquer le soutien plus faible qui est accordé à la politique des niveaux dans les régions où le taux d'immigration par habitant est plus élevé.

Pouvons-nous préciser la relation exacte qui existe entre le taux d'immigration et les effets négatifs sur le soutien de la politique des niveaux et d'autres attitudes et perceptions? Disons que non, ou du moins, pas encore. Certains résultats semblent indiquer qu'il pourrait y avoir un taux d'immigration par habitant régional minimum, qui se situerait entre 0,5 et 1,0 %, avant que des effets négatifs ne commencent à se manifester, mais, pour l'instant, il ne s'agit que d'une conjecture raisonnée. De plus, nos analyses laissent croire que ce seuil pourrait augmenter ou diminuer en fonction des conditions économiques et d'autres facteurs qui influent sur les attitudes et les perceptions liées à l'immigration. En outre, il faudrait effectuer de nouvelles recherches pour établir avec plus de certitude que les différences régionales du taux d'immigration sont réellement la cause de ce soutien relativement faible envers la politique relative aux niveaux d'immigration et que cet effet est fonction des perceptions plus spécifiques à

une collectivité, qui ont été mentionnées plus haut. Ce qu'il faudrait surtout, à cet égard, ce sont des enquêtes plus larges sur les questions liées à l'immigration, des enquêtes qui couvriraient l'ensemble des perceptions et des inquiétudes qui pourraient être des déterminants importants du soutien de la politique relative aux niveaux d'immigration.

Attitudes face aux immigrants

Le lien qui existe entre le taux d'immigration régional par habitant et le soutien de la politique des niveaux, même s'il est, naturellement, très important compte tenu de son influence sur les décisions futures concernant cette politique et les questions de communications qui l'entourent, n'a pas nécessairement de conséquences directes pour l'intégration des immigrants : les attitudes envers une politique gouvernementale sur l'immigration ne sont pas nécessairement les mêmes que les attitudes envers les immigrants, en tant que personnes.

Les analyses des liens qui existent entre le taux d'immigration et les attitudes envers les immigrants — attitudes qui influeront directement sur leur intégration — sont limitées par la rareté des données que l'on possède sur ces attitudes. Les résultats permettent cependant de croire qu'un lien négatif s'est établi au commencement de la récession du début des années 1990, c'est-à-dire que les décisions concernant les niveaux d'immigration prises à ce moment pourraient avoir contribué à accroître les préjugés dans les régions ayant accueilli beaucoup d'immigrants. La qualité de la base de données sur les attitudes vis-à-vis des immigrants n'est toutefois pas suffisante pour nous permettre de tirer des conclusions bien arrêtées à cet égard.

Comme les rares données disponibles semblent indiquer que la politique relative aux niveaux peut avoir des répercussions sur le niveau de racisme observé dans les collectivités qui reçoivent le plus grand nombre d'immigrants, il est urgent d'obtenir de meilleures données sur les attitudes vis-à-vis des immigrants. Seules des données de meilleure qualité nous permettront de confirmer cette relation et de la préciser, et de prendre des décisions éclairées quant au nombre d'immigrants à accueillir et aux initiatives à prendre pour lutter contre les préjugés, pour empêcher que la politique adoptée n'entraîne des conséquences non souhaitables.

Résumé

Nous constatons une différence marquée entre les régions à forte immigration et celles où se rendent actuellement relativement peu d'immigrants, différences qui deviennent encore plus évidentes lorsque l'analyse élimine l'effet de masquage qu'entraîne la présence d'un nombre important d'immigrants dans les collectivités où les nouveaux immigrants viennent s'installer en plus grand nombre. Lorsque nous étudions de façon distincte les populations d'immigrants et de personnes nées au Canada, nous constatons clairement l'influence de la répartition inégale des immigrants entre les différentes régions sur les attitudes et les perceptions des deux populations. Dans les régions où l'on retrouve une concentration importante d'immigrants, on observe un soutien relativement faible à la politique des niveaux qui ne peut s'expliquer par les perceptions quant à l'incidence de l'immigration sur l'emploi ou la culture, et qui est contraire aux tendances que les différences de niveau d'instruction et d'âge permettraient de prédire.

Les résultats concernant les autres mesures indiquent que, même si cela peut, dans une certaine mesure, refléter les différentes perceptions concernant le taux actuel d'immigration, l'estimation du nombre réel d'immigrants influence peu les préférences exprimées quant au nombre d'immigrants à accueillir. Ils montrent aussi que les différences régionales pour ce qui est notamment des perceptions quant aux avantages éventuels d'une croissance de la population et les inquiétudes concernant, par exemple, la détermination du statut de réfugié, le respect des obligations de parrainage et la criminalité chez les immigrants, sont plus importantes. Cette constatation cadre bien avec le fait que ce type de problèmes reçoit une attention médiatique beaucoup plus importante dans les régions où s'établissent actuellement un grand nombre d'immigrants.

Selon les analyses effectuées, la répartition inégale des immigrants a eu une incidence sur plusieurs aspects de l'opinion publique à l'égard de l'immigration. Cette incidence s'est fait sentir, plus que dans tout autre lieu, à Vancouver, où les changements sociaux rapides attribuables à l'immigration récente semblent avoir eu de profondes répercussions sur les attitudes et les perceptions. L'appui manifesté pour la politique des niveaux continue d'être relativement faible dans cette ville, et ses résidents continuent d'être parmi les habitants du Canada les plus susceptibles de considérer que l'immigration a eu des répercussions négatives sur leur

collectivité. Selon les sondages les plus récents, toutefois, l'appui pour la politique des niveaux tend nettement à s'accroître, notamment chez les résidents de Vancouver et d'autres régions à forte immigration. Mais, au milieu de 1999, les effets positifs de la reprise économique n'avaient pas encore été suffisants pour compenser entièrement les effets négatifs, dans ces régions, des taux d'immigration récemment élevés.

Les conclusions générales que permettent de tirer ces résultats sont les suivantes : a) il y a un lien entre l'augmentation des taux d'immigration et la baisse du soutien manifesté pour la politique des niveaux d'immigration; b) ce lien est modéré par la situation économique; c) au cours des dernières années, dans les régions à forte immigration, l'amélioration de la situation économique a eu une influence favorable sur le soutien manifesté pour la politique des niveaux, mais pas assez pour compenser les effets négatifs entraînés par des taux d'immigration relativement élevés; et d) bien que la rareté des données nous empêche de tirer des conclusions définitives au sujet des attitudes envers les immigrants, qui auront des répercussions directes sur la réussite de leur intégration, les résultats semblent indiquer qu'une perception négative de la politique des niveaux pourrait aussi avoir un effet néfaste dans ce domaine, d'où l'urgence de recueillir des données de meilleure qualité sur les attitudes.

Tableau 4. Proportion de la population totale, proportion du nombre total d'immigrants en 1995-1997, taux d'immigration par habitant, proportion de personnes nées au Canada dans la population, pourcentage d'immigrants par rapport aux personnes nées au Canada et pourcentage d'immigrants par rapport aux personnes nées à l'étranger, par région.

	% pop. Totale	% imm. 1995-1997	Imm. pour 100 pers. de la pop. totale	% de pers. nées au Canada dans la pop.	Nombre d'imm. pour 100 pers. nées au Canada	Nombre d'imm. pour 100 pers. nées à l'étrang.
Toronto	15,1	44,1	2,24	58	3,86	5,33
Vancouver	6,6	19,3	2,24	65	3,45	6,40
Combiné	21,7	63,4	2,24	60	3,73	5,60
Montréal	11,6	10,4	,69	82	,84	3,83
Alberta (urb.)	5,9	5,5	,71	80	,89	3,55
Ontario (urb.)	12,5	5,0	,31	81	,38	1,63
Ontario (rural)	10,2	5,0	,38	89	,43	3,45
C.-B. (rural)	5,1	2,2	,33	86	,38	2,36
Combiné	45,3	28,1	,47	83	,63	2,76
7 plus import.	67,0	91,5	1,05	76	1,38	4,38
Autres	33,0	8,5	,20	95	,21	4,00
Canada	100,0	100,0	,77	83,4	,92	4,64

CANADIAN ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS REGARDING IMMIGRATION: RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL PER CAPITA IMMIGRATION AND OTHER CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

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The opinions and interpretations expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Citizenship & Immigration Canada.

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Some key findings

How do levels policy decisions, determining the number of immigrants who come to Canada each year, affect Canadians' attitudes and perceptions related to immigration? Do higher or lower rates of immigration affect public attitudes to any meaningful extent or are such attitudes and perceptions only really determined by factors like the state of the economy or the individual's age or level of education? To what extent do levels policy decisions affect policy support? And what about their effect on attitudes that will promote or impede the integration process through their expression in behaviour toward immigrants? An examination of Canadians' attitudes and perceptions related to immigration, within their regional and historical context, while not providing definitive answers to all these questions, does enable at least some tentative conclusions.

Rates of immigration

In any attempt to examine levels policy effects, obviously the key contextual factor is the rate of immigration. By relating year-to-year or regional variations in that rate to analogous variations in attitudes and perceptions, we can look for evidence of parallel changes that would suggest a linkage between them.

The most commonly provided statistics describing the rate of immigration, the total number of immigrants landed or the per cent of that total destined for a given region, are inappropriate for our purposes because they fail to consider changes over time or regional differences in total population. For example, recent years have seen 50 to 55% of newcomers settling in Ontario and just over 20% going to British Columbia, supporting an impression that the rate for Ontario is over twice the rate for British Columbia. Adjusting those figures to reflect the respective population sizes of the two regions, shows that the rate for British Columbia is actually substantially greater than that for Ontario. Similarly, the immigration totals of 194,000 in 1951 and 193,000 in 1989 obviously represent very different rates of immigration when considered in the

context of Canada's population at those respective points in time -- 14 million versus 26 million.

While the usual unadjusted statistics are appropriate for purposes such as allocating expenditures on settlement programs, where the key element is the number of new immigrants being helped, the adjusted numbers are more appropriate when examining any effects on the attitudes of existing residents.

Regional rates

Figure A shows the rate of immigration proportional to national and regional population size for the period from 1969 to 1998.

Among the things to be noted from this figure are: (1) the national rate of immigration was lower from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s than it was during the earlier part of the 1970s and over the period covering the end of the 1980s and all of the 1990s; (2) over the three decades, Ontario and British Columbia consistently experienced substantially greater per capita rates of immigration than did other regions (except for Alberta, which experienced equally high rates between 1976 and 1986); (3) these regional differences are more marked in the years when the national rate is relatively high -- that is, when the level has gone up, the regional imbalance has increased; and (4) since the national rate has been relatively high for the most recent ten years, the regional imbalance has been consistently greater over that period than during the preceding ten-year period.

So, historically, the dispersion of new immigrants across the country has been uneven and in recent years has become more so. By implication, to the extent that the effects of immigration are felt more strongly in the regions in which new immigrants settle, differential levels policy effects should be discernible on both social and economic dimensions, and those effects should be of a greater magnitude in Ontario and British Columbia than elsewhere in the country. And, if anything, those differences should be more marked over the more recent years than during the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s.

While this may be stating the obvious with respect to the effects of immigration on indices such as regional population growth and regional demand for

Figure A. Per capita immigration flow by region, 1969-1998.



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goods and services of various kinds (after adjustment for internal migration), it is perhaps less obvious when we enter the realm of public opinion. Various survey results suggest public knowledge of immigration matters falls far short of ideal levels. Also, attitudes and perceptions regarding immigration may be as much a question of factors like racism or economic security as they are a function of experiencing the effects of immigration. Thus, it is not a forgone conclusion that we will find regional differences on those dimensions that correspond to regional variations in the magnitude of the inflow of new immigrants. In other words, we might find that residents of Ontario and British Columbia, where the majority of new immigrants are settling, because of that fact are more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants coming, compared to those living elsewhere; on the other hand, we might find that the opposite is true and that residents of other regions are more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants, perhaps out of relatively greater levels of prejudice or economic insecurity.

Regional attitudes

Table "A" shows a six-region breakdown of the country, ordered according to the per capita rate of immigration over the 1995-97 period. As well as the regional population and immigration statistics, the table also shows the results for two questions asked in a series of ten Angus Reid surveys over the 1996-98 period. (Survey results are combined to increase the reliability of the regional estimates.)

With respect to levels policy support, we see that residents of the regions to which the rate of immigration is greatest are substantially more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants coming to Canada and slightly less likely to say there are "too few", compared to the residents of other regions. Regarding perceptions of effects on the community, there are substantially greater tendencies to perceive negative effects in the regions with the greatest per capita immigration rates but almost no differences in the reporting of positive effects.

Table A. Per capita immigration flow, attitude towards levels policy and perceived effect of immigration on the community, by region (combined results of Angus Reid surveys from January 1996 to October 1998).

region	% of pop.	% of flow	flow per 100 pop.	% saying too many immigrants	% saying too few immigrants	% saying negative effect	% saying positive effect	sample size
british columbia	12.9	21.9	1.30	47	6	25	44	(1942)
ontario	37.3	54.1	1.11	45	7	20	44	(5733)
alberta	9.4	6.3	.51	43	7	18	45	(1372)
quebec	24.7	13.0	.40	39	8	19	47	(3868)
manitoba & sask.	7.3	2.5	.27	37	11	14	44	(1094)
atlantic prov.	8.1	2.3	.20	39	9	14	39	(1255)
canada	100.0	100.0	.77	42	8	19	44	(15265)
f-values:				17.15***	4.42***	10.40***	2.44*	

Note. Population data from Statistics Canada. Immigration data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada for 1995-97.

F-values test the statistical significance of regional variation: * $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$.

Survey questions: "In your opinion, do you feel that there are too many, too few or about the right number of immigrants coming to Canada?" and "In general, what effect does immigration to this country have on your community?"

So, the current survey data strongly suggest that the uneven regional distribution of the current immigration flow leads to differential levels policy effects on public attitudes and perceptions: Opposition to immigration and perceptions of negative effects of immigration on the community are more prevalent in regions receiving higher rates of immigration. Is this a new development, resulting from recent increases in the imbalance of settlement patterns in conjunction with the prolonged effects of the 1990s recession?

The historical database suggests that the less marked but still uneven distribution of the immigration flow in the 1980s was accompanied by partially similar regional differences in levels policy support: when we look at earlier survey results, compared to the residents of other regions, British Columbia residents showed consistently weaker levels policy support and Ontario residents did likewise at the beginning of the 1980s.

However, Ontario residents showed stronger support than other regions during the economic boom of the later part of that decade. But, the recent surveys, up to the point of surveys in late 1998 and early 1999, show the improving employment picture in Ontario has not resulted in the elimination of the deficit in levels policy support there, relative to other regions with lower per capita immigration rates. This suggests that the higher levels and greater unevenness of settlement patterns in the 1990s may be hindering a replication of the rapprochement between Ontario and those regions which occurred in the late 1980s.

Underlying factors

Recent surveys provide some information about the dynamics underlying the relative weakness in levels policy support in the major immigrant-receiving regions.

First, the results suggest that it is <u>not</u> a case of just among the Canadian-born residents of those regions that levels policy support is relatively weak. Members of the immigrant communities in those regions also show less support for levels policy than do their counterparts in other regions (though,

in almost all regions, levels policy support is stronger among those born outside the country than among those born in Canada).

As well, the current data suggest that perceptions in the major immigrant-receiving regions are not less favourable regarding the effects of immigration on employment opportunities or on culture, compared to other regions. Immigrant respondents have more favourable perceptions of those effects than do survey respondents born in Canada and, because they comprise a greater proportion of the populations in the major immigrant-receiving regions, overall such perceptions are actually more favourable there than in other regions.

Further analyses suggest that it is not just a greater awareness of exactly how many immigrants are coming but that the differences in levels policy support are more related to concerns about issues such as crime, refugee determination, fulfilment of sponsorship obligations, population growth and the earlier-mentioned overall effects on the community. On such measures, we find evidence of greater levels of concern in the major immigrant-receiving regions than elsewhere, results which parallel the pattern of regional differences in levels policy support. In other words, rather than perceptions of general effects of immigration on the economy or culture, greater perceptions of problematic effects of a more community-specific nature appear to underlie the weaker support for levels policy in the regions with greater per capita immigration rates.

Can we specify the exact relation between the rate of immigration and the occurrence of negative effects on levels policy support and other attitudes and perceptions? Briefly, no or, at least, not yet. There is some suggestion that there may be a threshold of a regional per capita rate somewhere in the range of 0.5% to 1.0% before negative effects start to appear but, at this point in time, this is only a reasoned guess. Moreover, our analyses suggest this threshold would rise and fall as a function of economic conditions and other factors which affect attitudes and perceptions related to immigration. And, more importantly, further research is required to establish with greater certainty that the regional differences in the rate of immigration are the true cause of these relative weaknesses in levels policy support and that those effects are mediated by the above-mentioned more community-specific perceptions. One of the key needs

in this respect is for broader-based surveys of immigration issues, surveys that cover the full range of perceptions and concerns which may be important determinants of levels policy support.

Attitudes toward immigrants

The relation between regional per capita flow rates and levels policy support, while, of course, being important with respect to its influence on subsequent decisions regarding that policy and communications issues surrounding it, need not have direct implications for immigrant integration -- attitudes towards a government policy on immigration are not necessarily the same as attitudes towards immigrants as people.

Analyses of the relation between immigration flow rates and the attitudes towards immigrants -- attitudes that will directly affect integration -- are limited by the scarcity of data on these attitudes. The results do suggest a negative relation occurred during the onset of the recession in the early 1990s, implying that levels policy decisions at that time may have contributed to an increase in prejudice in the regions in which the flow was most concentrated. The quality of the database regarding attitudes towards immigrants does not suffice, however, to make firm conclusions in this regard.

Given that the sparse data that are available suggest levels policy can have an impact on the level of racism present in the major immigrant-receiving communities, the need for better data on attitudes towards immigrants is pressing. Only data of this nature will enable confirmation and specification of that relation and, as a result, inform future policy decisions with respect to what combination of decisions, in the areas of levels policy and policies involving prejudice-reducing initiatives, is necessary to avoid such untoward policy consequences.

Summary

We see distinct differences between the major immigrant-receiving regions and those to which relatively few current immigrants go, differences that become more strongly evident when the analysis removes the masking influence of the greater immigrant presence in the former communities. When we look at the immigrant and Canadian-born populations separately, we see a clear influence of the uneven regional distribution of the immigration flow on attitudes and perceptions in both. Weaker levels policy support is found in regions where the flow is concentrated, a relative weakness that cannot be accounted for by perceptions of effects in the areas of employment or culture and runs contrary to the pattern that educational and age differences would predict.

The results on other measures suggest that, while this may to some extent reflect different perceptions regarding the current rate of immigration, estimates of the actual numbers play a limited role in determining levels policy preferences and that regional differences in factors such as beliefs about the desirability of population growth and concerns regarding issues such as refugee determination, fulfilment of sponsorship obligations and immigrant criminality are more important. This, of course, fits well with the fact that there is much greater media coverage of any problems associated with these program areas in the regions where more current immigrants settle.

These analyses suggest the uneven distribution of the immigration flow has produced differential levels policy effects on several aspects of public opinion related to immigration. And, nowhere is this more the case than in Vancouver where the rapid rate of social change due to recent immigration appears to have had marked effects on attitudes and perceptions. Levels policy support continues to be relatively weak in that city and its residents continue to be among the most likely in the country to report that immigration has had a negative effect on their community. The most recent surveys do show a significant trend toward increasing levels policy support, including among residents of Vancouver and other major immigrant-receiving regions. But, as of mid-1999, the positive effects of the economic recovery have not been sufficient to fully counteract the negative effects, in those regions, of the higher recent flow rates.

recent surveys, and in British Columbia and the Manitoba-Saskatchewan region, with those age effects being somewhat stronger on attitudes toward immigrants than on levels policy support.

Attitudinal data sources and analytical approach

Most of the analyses presented here will use data from two series of national surveys.

The first of these is a series of 12 surveys conducted by Environics Research between 1981 and 1998, using an in-person method of data collection and with a national sample size of approximately 2000, yielding a total sample size in excess of 24,000. The primary question of interest in these surveys is one soliciting agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Overall there is too much immigration to Canada." As well as that measure of levels policy support, a second question, asked in a subset of these surveys, will also be included in some analyses. That question, soliciting agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Non-whites should not be allowed to immigrate to Canada", serves as a measure of the attitude toward immigrants.

The second series of surveys analyzed here are 22 national telephone surveys which have included the question "In your opinion, do you feel there are too few, too many or about the right number of immigrants coming to Canada?", which will serve as our primary measure of levels policy support in recent years. This series of surveys, conducted between 1988 and 1998, includes data collected by several different organizations -- primarily Angus Reid but also Ekos Research, Insight Research and Gallup Canada -- with national sample sizes ranging from just over 1000 to just under 2400, yielding a combined total sample size in excess of 33,000. Other questions, asked in a subset of these surveys, will also be included in analyses examining other perceptions related to immigration, such as the perceived effects of immigration on employment opportunities, on culture and on the community, and perceptions with respect to the actual level of immigration, refugee determination, criminality screening and other aspects of program performance.

The overall conclusions suggested by these results are: (a) higher rates of immigration are associated with decreased support for levels policy; (b) that relation is moderated by economic conditions; (c) in recent years, in the major immigrant-receiving regions, the positive effects on levels policy support due to improving economic conditions have not been strong enough to counteract the negative effects due to relatively high rates of immigration; and (d) while data scarcity prevents firm conclusions regarding attitudes toward immigrants that will impact directly on integration success, results do suggest possible negative levels policy effects on them as well, underlining the urgency of collecting better data on those attitudes.

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Canadian attitudes and perceptions regarding immigration:
Relations with regional per capita immigration
and other contextual factors

This report will discuss the results of a number of Canadian surveys and what we can infer from them with respect to the dynamics of public opinion regarding immigration by examining how differences in attitudes and perceptions, over time and across the various regions of the country, relate to differences on a number of contextual dimensions. The contextual factors considered will include those shown to be important by past research -- the unemployment rate, education, gender and age -- and the rate of immigration. The effects of this last factor, immigration flow, are of primary interest as they may provide information with respect to the consequences of levels policy decisions.

Differing types of attitudes

In discussing public opinion related to immigration, of the distinctions that must be made, probably the most important is between the attitude toward immigration -- how Canadians feel about the government policy in this area -- and the attitude toward immigrants -- how Canadians feel about and act toward the newcomers as people. While the two attitudes are certainly related, they are certainly not identical -- an individual may hold much more favourable than average attitudes toward immigrants yet may strongly feel that current policy is producing a level of immigration greater than what can be accommodated without adverse economic or social consequences for both residents and newcomers alike.

For example, individual "A" may find that immigrants, compared to the average Canadian, tend to be more educated, intelligent, motivated and interesting people, and, as a result, may prefer to have immigrants as co-workers, neighbours and friends. At the same time, despite these feelings, individual "A" may believe that the rate of immigration is too high because of perceptions that the state of the economy cannot sustain such a large addition to the labour force or that the social infrastructure cannot handle that large an addition to the size of the population.

In contrast, individual "B" may be relatively bigoted, disliking people who are culturally different from him or herself. Such feelings of prejudice against immigrants as people would make "B" feel that the level of immigration is too high, perhaps in spite of perceptions that immigration is good for the economy.

So, when we see a survey result saying that X% of Canadians feel that there are too many immigrants coming to Canada, we do not know to what extent that opposition is motivated by prejudice and to what extent it is driven by unprejudiced perceptions of negative policy effects.

While there may be substantial debate concerning the extent to which these two types of attitudes are distinguishable from each other, readers should bear in mind that they are, at least theoretically, potentially quite independent. Where the present report discusses results on measures of attitudes and perceptions regarding immigration policy, great caution should be exercised in drawing any inferences with respect to what those results say about the public's attitude towards immigrants as people.

Distinguishing between attitudes toward immigration policy and attitudes toward immigrants is also very important with regard to their respective policy implications. Policy support is, of course, one of the keys to successful policy implementation. The attitude toward immigrants, however, as well as having influence on policy support, also has important implications with respect to integration. Taking our example individuals "A" and "B" above, while both would oppose that current immigration levels policy, their differing attitudes toward immigrants would have a correspondingly different impact on the integration of newcomers with whom they were in contact. "A" would, if anything, give preferential treatment to newcomers with respect to hiring decisions, workplace and social interactions, or the provision of housing or other services, whereas "B" would discriminate against them. Hence, while a decrease or regional deficit in levels policy support will always have implications with respect to implementation of that policy, its implications with respect to immigrant integration will depend on the extent to which it is driven or accompanied by

negative attitudes toward immigrants versus other negative perceptions of policy consequences.

Policy effects on attitudes

As well as public attitudes affecting whether policy can be successfully implemented or what policy actions are necessary to promote immigrant integration or to prevent erosion of policy support, those attitudes are, of course, to some extent the result of policy decisions. How Canadians feel about current or proposed policy, as well as being determined by current social and economic conditions and factors such as age and level of education, will also reflect their experience and perception of previous policy. Thus, as well as providing important information with respect to policy needs and implementation, understanding the factors driving public attitudes related to immigration can also inform us with respect to policy effects. One of the aims of the analyses presented here will be to examine the extent and nature of the effects of levels policy on Canadians' attitudes and perceptions related to immigration.

Research has shown that public opinion in the immigration area is related to education, gender, and economic conditions as measured by the unemployment rate, as well as other factors. Studies have consistently shown: relatively well-educated respondents are less likely to feel the level of immigration is too high, compared to less-educated respondents; males are less opposed to immigration than are females; and opposition to immigration is greater during periods of high unemployment than when the rate of unemployment is relatively low. Hence, to examine the effects of levels policy decisions on public attitudes requires analyses to consider the effects of these other factors.

Examining levels policy effects

To examine the effects of levels policy on public attitudes requires comparing attitudes under differing conditions with respect to the level of immigration.

One obvious way to do this would be to compare how Canadians' attitudes differ in years when the level of immigration is relatively high from their attitudes in years when the level is relatively low. While we will utilize this approach, year-to-year changes in levels policy are not the only variations in the rate of immigration whose effects can be examined. There are also substantial differences in the rates of immigration to the various regions of the country.

Incorporating these regional rates into our analyses is advantageous in two respects. First, since there is some independence between the national rate and the regional rates -- that is, changes at the national level are not always reflected in changes at the regional level and vice versa -- and the variations between the regional rates tend to be larger than the national year-to-year variations, incorporating the regional rates makes the analysis more powerful. Second, and perhaps more important, such analyses can inform us with respect to the effects of the uneven regional settlement patterns on the attitudes and perceptions held by Canadians.

Regional settlement patterns

Table 1 shows the regional distribution of new immigrants to Canada for the period from 1978 to 1997, expressed in per capita terms -- that is, the number of new immigrants for each one hundred existing residents of the region. These estimates are derived from annual statistics on the intended province of destination (see Table A-1 in the Appendix) and population estimates from Statistics Canada Census Data. It should be noted that these figures would not reflect any effects of internal migration subsequent to the immigrant's arrival. Some smaller provinces with similar flow rates have been combined to simplify description and for statistical purposes (their survey sample sizes are too small to yield adequately reliable estimates of public opinion).

While the actual number of immigrants or the proportion of the total flow going to a given region would be the appropriate statistic to examine for, say, the purpose of allocating resources to facilitate settlement, for the purpose of

Table 1. Immigration flow per 100 residents by region, 1978-1997.

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1979-97
b c	.47	.62	.91	.81	.69	.52	.47	.44	.44	.65	.78	.83	.91	.99	1.11	1.34	1.40	1.24	1.41	1.26	.86
ontario	.51	.62	.74	.65	.61	.46	.48	.46	.56	.92	.95	1.10	1.17	1.20	1.37	1.31	1.13	1.10	1.13	1.10	.88
alberta	.46	.59	.86	.87	.80	.47	.47	.39	.41	.51	.59	.67	.77	.68	.70	.72	.69	.54	.52	.48	.61
quebec	.23	.31	.35	.33	.33	.26	.23	.23	.30	.42	.39	.52	.61	.77	.71	.66	.40	.39	.42	.39	.41
man & sask	.26	.40	.58	.40	.36	.28	.30	.27	.28	.34	.36	.40	.45	.40	.37	.35	.30	.27	.27	.27	.34
atlantic	.10	.15	.16	.14	.11	.08	.09	.09	.10	.11	.11	.14	.14	.13	.18	.21	.22	.22	.21	.18	.14
canada	.37	.47	.60	.54	.50	.36	.36	.34	.40	.60	.63	.74	.82	.86	.93	.93	.80	.75	.79	.75	.63
flow (000s)	86	112	143	129	121	89	89	85	100	153	163	193	218	233	255	257	224	213	226	216	165
pop (000000s)	23.5	23.7	23.9	24.1	24.3	24.5	24.6	24.8	25.0	25.4	25.8	26.2	26.6	27.0	27.3	27.6	27.9	28.2	28.5	28.8	25.9

looking at the effects of immigration flow on public attitudes, the appropriate statistic is one that is weighted by the size of the existing regional population. In other words, were a city of 100,000 residents to receive 1000 new immigrants and a town of 1000 residents to receive 1000 new immigrants, it might be appropriate to allocate similar dollar amounts to each community for immigrant settlement. However, if one is talking about the rate of immigration flow being experienced by and affecting the attitudes and perceptions of existing residents, in that smaller community, one out of every two people you ran into would be a newcomer whereas it would be less than one in a hundred in the larger community. Hence, the per capita rate is the one of choice for our analyses.

Note that expressing the immigration flow in per capita terms has a substantial impact on our perception of how the flow is distributed to the various regions. Looking at the percentages of total flow in Table A-1 in the Appendix, one would conclude the flow to Ontario to be about three times as great as the flow to British Columbia aver the last twenty years. In contrast, the per capita figures in Table 1 show their rates have been virtually identical on average and actually greater for British Columbia from 1980 through 1983 and from 1993 through 1997.

There is a fair degree of consistency in the regional patterns of settlement. The per capita rate of flow to Ontario and British Columbia has, in most years, been the greatest. Of the remaining four regions, the rate of flow to Alberta has been greater than to the others in all but two years and the Atlantic region has experienced the lowest flow rate in all years, with Quebec and the Manitoba-Saskatchewan region receiving intermediate rates. With respect to these last two regions, the flow to Quebec has tended to be somewhat greater since 1986, while prior to that year the rate for Manitoba-Saskatchewan was the greater of the two. Other variations to note include the fact that the flows to British Columbia and Ontario were roughly equal to the flow to Alberta prior to 1984, though consistently greater since then, and that, while the flow to Ontario substantially exceeded the flow to British Columbia between 1986 and 1992, the

rate of flow to British Columbia is the greater of the two in each of the subsequent years.

Nationally, there is a marked trend toward greater per capita flow rates over the more recent ten years. The average rate over the twenty-year period was .63, which was the level in 1988. The rates for the years from 1978 to 1987 were all lower than that average while the rates for all subsequent years were above that average. Note that this tendency for the rate of flow to be substantially greater in the more recent years is not equally reflected in the various regions but almost exclusively in Ontario and British Columbia. In other words, while the regional rates of flow were uneven during the earlier part of the twenty-year period, with Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta tending to receive more than their share of new immigrants on a per capita basis, the regional imbalance became markedly greater as Ontario and British Columbia absorbed almost all of the substantial increase in the national immigration rate.

In our analyses, we will use the regional per capita flow rate for the year prior to the survey in question as an index of the rate of immigration flow being experienced by the survey participants.

Regional unemployment rates

Figure 1 shows the annual unemployment figures for the six regions over the 1975-98 period. These rates were obtained from the Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey (see also Table A-2 in the Appendix).

Looking at the national averages, the effects of the two major economic recessions are clearly discernible, each marked by four years of double-digit unemployment. On the national level, both the onset and recovery phases appear to have been more rapid in the earlier recession, with a sharper initial increase in unemployment and a more rapid decline in the national rate. In comparing the severity of the two recessions, it should be remembered that discouraged workers leaving the workforce are not included in these figures.

There are marked regional differences that persist across virtually the entire time period, with the Atlantic region having the highest unemployment rate



Figure 1. Unemployment rate by region, 1975-98

capfig1

in all years, usually followed by Quebec with the second-highest rate. Manitoba-Saskatchewan and Alberta tend to have the lowest unemployment rates, followed by Ontario and British Columbia.

Regarding changes over time and the effects of the two recessions, regional differences are also evident. Perhaps most striking is the disproportional effect of the 1980s recession had on unemployment in Alberta and British Columbia, where rates increased by roughly six points compared to around three points in other regions. During the 1990s recession, in contrast, while Ontario's rate climbed by four points and Quebec's by around two and a half, Alberta's increase was less than a point and British Columbia's rate actually fell by half a point when the 1991-94 period is compared to 1986-90.

These rate changes during the 1991-94 period must, of course, be looked at in the context of the changes representing the recovery from the 1982-85 period of increased unemployment. During the intervening 1986-90 period, while Ontario and Quebec recovered all their job losses from the earlier recession, recovery was only partial (about 50%) in the other regions. The declining rates during the 1995-98 period, by comparison, have been more balanced regionally. Hence, while in Ontario and Quebec, we clearly have a pattern of recession-recovery-recession-recovery, in the other regions it is perhaps more a case of a protracted recession followed by an even more protracted recovery that hit a slight bump in the road in the early 1990s.

So, when we look at regional differences in levels policy support over this time period, these differing regional patterns of unemployment would be expected to generate correspondingly different levels of fear of job competition from newcomers and, hence, need to be considered in our analyses. It should also be noted, referring back to Table 1, that while the immigration totals declined in response to the increased unemployment in the 1982-85 period, the immigration totals increased when unemployment increased during the 1991-94 period.

Education and age differences

As well as regional differences in immigration flow rates and the level of unemployment, inspection of survey data collected over the past two decades reveals there are fairly consistent differences between the regions with respect to age and education. Since past research has shown both these variables to be associated with levels policy support, such regional variations become important contextual factors to be considered in any examination of how regional differences in levels policy support may be related to the rate of the immigration flow.

As can be seen in Tables A-3 and A-4 in the Appendix, there is a definite tendency for the residents of regions which receive greater per capita immigration flow to have a higher average level of education than the residents of regions receiving relatively less immigration. Given that past studies have almost always found a strong positive relation between education and levels policy support, this regional trend with respect to education, in the absence of other factors, would lead us to expect that levels policy support would be greater in the regions with greater immigration flow rates, as they are the regions whose residents tend to have more education.

It should also be noted that, in all regions, there is a trend toward increasing average educational levels over time. This trend would lead us to expect a corresponding trend over time toward greater levels policy support.

Comparing the regional educational patterns portrayed in Table A-3, containing data from in-person surveys, to the data from telephone surveys in Table A-4, we see differences along with the parallel trends summarized above. The data from in-person interviews show a lower average education than is found in the telephone surveys, only part of which can be attributed to the inclusion of older surveys in the former. As well, the regional rankings differ with respect to Alberta and Quebec. In the telephone surveys, these two regions tie for third and fourth ranks while the data from in-person surveys place Alberta in a tie for the top rank with British Columbia and show Quebec tied for the bottom rank with the Manitoba-Saskatchewan and Atlantic regions.

Given that education is consistently found to be strongly associated with attitudes related to immigration, these differences between the in-person and telephone samples become important when comparing regional patterns in attitudes found in the two sets of surveys. Of concern to the present analyses is not so much the origin of the sampling difference -- a sampling frame based on geographical units versus telephone exchanges, differences between Canadians willing to talk to an interviewer on the phone versus willing to invite an interviewer into the house -- as much as the fact that the sampling difference appears to have stronger effects in one region than another. Because of this, any comparison of results across the two types of surveys which does not control for level of education would be expected to show differences in regional patterns that are the product of the differential sampling effects. For example, the Quebec in-person samples will show attitudes that are less favourable to immigration, relative to other regions, when compared to the relative favourability of the attitudes of the Quebec telephone samples.

Turning to the regional and temporal variations in the age of survey respondents, shown in Tables A-5 and A-6 in the Appendix, both types of surveys reveal some consistent patterns.

In both tables, an increasing trend over time in the average age of the samples is evident, reflecting the aging of the Canadian population. With respect to regional differences, both sets of surveys show the samples from British Columbia and the Manitoba-Saskatchewan region to be, on average, slightly older than the samples from the other regions.

Regarding how we would expect these age differences to be reflected in attitudes related to immigration, past research has found that younger individuals tend to have more favourable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, though in the case of levels policy support, age effects tend to be quite small and often disappear once education and employment status are taken into consideration. Also, the variations over time and across regions are not very large. However, we would expect them to contribute to relatively less favourable attitudes toward immigrants and weaker levels policy support in more

recent surveys, and in British Columbia and the Manitoba-Saskatchewan region, with those age effects being somewhat stronger on attitudes toward immigrants than on levels policy support.

Attitudinal data sources and analytical approach

Most of the analyses presented here will use data from two series of national surveys.

The first of these is a series of 12 surveys conducted by Environics Research between 1981 and 1998, using an in-person method of data collection and with a national sample size of approximately 2000, yielding a total sample size in excess of 24,000. The primary question of interest in these surveys is one soliciting agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Overall there is too much immigration to Canada." As well as that measure of levels policy support, a second question, asked in a subset of these surveys, will also be included in some analyses. That question, soliciting agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Non-whites should not be allowed to immigrate to Canada", serves as a measure of the attitude toward immigrants.

The second series of surveys analyzed here are 22 national telephone surveys which have included the question "In your opinion, do you feel there are too few, too many or about the right number of immigrants coming to Canada?", which will serve as our primary measure of levels policy support in recent years. This series of surveys, conducted between 1988 and 1998, includes data collected by several different organizations -- primarily Angus Reid but also Ekos Research, Insight Research and Gallup Canada -- with national sample sizes ranging from just over 1000 to just under 2400, yielding a combined total sample size in excess of 33,000. Other questions, asked in a subset of these surveys, will also be included in analyses examining other perceptions related to immigration, such as the perceived effects of immigration on employment opportunities, on culture and on the community, and perceptions with respect to the actual level of immigration, refugee determination, criminality screening and other aspects of program performance.

The first set of analyses will examine both series of surveys in their entirety, with respect to evidence of a relation between levels policy support and the rate of immigration flow. The analyses will examine this relation across the entire time period spanned by each series of surveys and year by year. These analyses will be performed both without controlling the effects of other variables -- that is, the simple correlations between levels policy support and immigration flow rates -- and controlling for the effects of gender, age, education and unemployment rates -- that is, the relation between policy support and flow shown by the beta value for flow in a regression equation predicting levels policy support that also includes those other predictor variables. The results of secondary analyses looking at the effects of respondent birthplace will also be discussed. Similar analyses dealing with the relation between immigration flow and the attitude toward "non-white" immigration will also be presented.

The second set of analyses will focus more closely on relatively recent data -- mainly from Angus Reid surveys between 1996 and 1998. These analyses will employ a somewhat different geographic breakdown enabling an examination of attitudes and perceptions within a finer division of the major immigrant-receiving regions, breaking out the cities of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal separately. Here, we will primarily use an analysis of variance format that compares the averages of responses in the different communities, regions and groups of regions/communities to show how levels policy support and other attitudes and perceptions differ, or not, between them. This set of analyses will attempt to provide insight into the dynamics underlying regional differences in levels policy support by showing similarities and differences in the regional patterns of results with respect to other attitudes and perceptions. Other analyses will look at the most recent trends and, also, at how the birthplace of the interviewer may have a distorting effect on responses to survey questions related to immigration.

National trends

As shown in Figure 2, at the national level, year-to-year changes in levels policy opposition have roughly tended to mirror changes in the unemployment rate over the past two decades. This relation, first shown in a 1994 report using the data available up to that time, continues to be evident in more recent surveys. Over the 1995 to 1998 period, the continuing decline in the national unemployment rate has been reflected in a decline in opposition to immigration.

This relation suggests that, overall, the economic cycle is the most important determinant of changes over time in levels policy support but the reader's attention is drawn to the fact that the two lines in the figure are far from perfectly parallel, though the correspondence is quite high. Among the factors which will contribute to departures of the two trend lines are the occurrence of other events influencing levels policy support and errors in the survey estimates of that support.

Along with the occasional drawing of a sample that, by chance, is not representative of the population, a major potential source of distortion of survey results is the effect of preceding questions on the question of interest. We have demonstrated in earlier research that earlier questions can have a substantial impact on measures of levels policy support. Readers should note that the survey's "margin of error" only refers to distortion due to sampling vagaries and that a distortion due to the effects of preceding questions may easily lead to a result that is far outside of those margins.

For this reason, the "too few, too many" question has, in almost all cases, been placed very close to the beginning of the survey, protecting it from such distortions. However, in the Environics surveys, the "too much immigration" question is always placed well back in the interview and, hence, its estimates of levels policy support, on top of the usual and inescapable potential distortions due to sampling error, are also subject to potentially far greater distortions due to earlier questions. In this fashion, the "too much immigration" question must be considered a less reliable estimator of levels policy support than is the "too few, too many" question.

Figure 2. Agreement with "Overall, there is too much immigration to Canada"

Source: Environics surveys

cepfig2

The relevance of this discussion becomes evident when we examine the 1998 result in Figure 2 in comparison with earlier surveys and with the results in the most recent years for the "too few, too many" question, shown in Figure 3. Note that the 1998 "too much immigration" result shows less opposition to immigration than was found in any of the other surveys conducted by Environics over the past twenty years, and describes a very dramatic increase in levels policy support from their 1996 survey. In contrast, in Figure 3, we see a 1998 result for the "too few, too many" question that shows a continuing but far from as dramatic decrease in opposition since its 1996 result.

The "too few, too many" estimates of levels policy support in these years are based on much larger samples than those for the "too much immigration" question, which makes them less susceptible to distortions from sampling error. Because of this and because they are far less susceptible to potential distortion from earlier questions, we must consider them more reliable and conclude that the Environics 1998 result over-estimates the decrease in opposition to immigration since 1996.

Hence, while both these estimators indicate that opposition to immigration has decreased over the recent time period as unemployment has decreased, and while we do see a substantial increase in levels policy support on the "too few, too many" question in the later part of 1998, our best guess would be that it did not reach the "record high" suggested by the "too much immigration" 1998 result. This interpretation is confirmed by the initial analyses of January and March 1999 administrations of the "too few, too many" question, which give virtually identical findings as those for the later surveys in 1998, showing a degree of levels policy support that continues to fall short of that observed during the 1988 to 1990 period.

Results of the six-region analysis

Tables 2 and 3 show the regional results with respect to levels policy support in surveys between 1981 and 1998. Table 2 shows the results in surveys conducted by Environics which included the question asking respondents if they



Figure 3. In your opinion do you feel that there are too few, too many or about the right number of immigrants coming to Canada.

capfig3

Table 2. Levels policy support by region in Environics surveys from 1981 to 1998, annual means and relations with regional rate of flow -- "too much immigration" question.

region	1981	1983	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	all	(n)
br. columbia	-.06	-.07	-.13	-.12	-.15	-.06	-.04	-.06	-.14	.07	-.09	-.09	-.08	(2706)
ontario	-.06	-.02	-.01	.13	-.02	.09	.11	.00	.05	-.06	-.01	.05	.02	(6424)
alberta	.09	-.03	.24	-.06	-.02	.08	-.06	-.09	-.07	.02	-.03	.01	.01	(2563)
quebec	.14	.07	.01	.01	.10	-.05	.00	.13	.11	.12	-.11	-.07	.04	(6265)
man & sask	.00	-.03	-.05	-.17	-.02	-.16	-.06	-.01	.03	-.02	.26	.22	.00	(2967)
atlantic	-.18	.00	-.06	.02	.00	.03	-.08	-.10	-.16	-.16	.09	-.04	-.05	(3183)
correlation	-.02	-.03	.00	.05*	-.03	.05*	.06**	.00	.03	-.01	-.02	.00	.00	
beta values	-.07	-.06*	-.04	.01	-.10*	.01	.08*	.01	.04	-.03	-.05*	-.05*	-.03***	
raw mean	2.61	2.32	2.40	2.38	2.42	2.68	2.74	2.52	2.50	2.21	2.35	2.79	2.49	
(n)	(1840)	(1917)	(2042)	(2019)	(2053)	(2005)	(2002)	(2021)	(2005)	(1996)	(2000)	(2208)		(24108)

Note. Raw mean is average score on scale from 1 = "agree strongly" to 5 = "disagree strongly".
Regional scores are expressed as standardized deviations from annual mean (z-scores).
Beta values describe relations between levels policy support and flow, controlling for education, gender, age and regional unemployment rates. Significant negative correlations and beta values imply levels policy support tends to be greater in regions with lower flow.

t $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 3. Levels policy support by region in surveys from 1988 to 1998, annual means and relations with regional rate of flow -- "too few, too many" question.

region	1988	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	all	(n)
br. columbia	-.17	-.17	-.08	-.08	-.12	.09	-.01	-.06	-.18	-.12	-.09	(4670)
ontario	.07	.02	.05	-.13	-.13	-.20	-.07	-.06	-.01	-.06	-.06	(11048)
alberta	-.03	-.15	-.09	-.05	.05	-.05	.04	-.02	-.07	.02	-.03	(3029)
quebec	.05	.21	.08	.22	.22	.19	.05	.02	.04	.10	.11	(8350)
man & sask	.00	-.20	-.05	.09	.23	.04	.14	.13	.15	.15	.08	(2800)
atlantic	-.14	-.14	-.18	-.02	-.04	-.07	-.01	.18	.13	.01	-.01	(3162)
correlation	.04	-.01	.04	-.07***	-.11***	-.08***	-.05**	-.06***	-.07***	-.08***	-.07***	
beta values	-.11*	-.08*	.05	-.07***	-.13***	-.08***	-.06***	-.07***	-.09***	-.10***	-.10***	
raw mean	1.84	1.77	1.80	1.74	1.61	1.57	1.58	1.62	1.66	1.67	1.67	
(n)	(1513)	(3012)	(1500)	(3623)	(1275)	(3181)	(3690)	(4517)	(3016)	(7732)		(33059)

Note. Raw mean is average score on scale from 1 = "too many" to 3 = "too few".
Regional scores are expressed as standardized deviations from annual mean (z-scores).
Beta values describe relations between levels policy support and flow, controlling for education, gender, age and regional unemployment rates. Significant negative correlations and beta values imply levels policy support tends to be greater in regions with lower flow.

t $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

agreed or disagreed that there is "too much immigration". Table 3 shows the results of surveys by Angus Reid and other organizations which included the question asking respondents if there are "too few" or "too many" immigrants coming. It should be noted that, in Table 3, in most cases the results for a given year represent the combined results for two or more surveys.

In both tables, the regional results are presented in standard score form, relative to the raw mean (shown in the bottom row of the table), in order to facilitate comparing a region's standing relative to other regions from one year to another. In lay terms, this sets the average degree of levels policy support for the year at the value of zero and then shows how the average degree of levels policy support in each region compares to that national average, incorporating an adjustment for the overall variability of responses that year. Expressed in this form, a score of, say, .15, should represent a degree of levels policy support that is roughly the same amount above the national average regardless of which year or which question we are examining. That is, if we had perfect estimates and if there was no variation in the relative standing of the regions over time, each region would have the same standard score value in every year in both tables, despite the year-to-year variations in overall levels policy support and the fact that the two questions differ in their wording and response options.

As inspection of the tables reveals, this is far from the case, which is only to be expected. After all, we expect each estimate of a regional average to have a certain amount of error associated with it and, further, we know from the data on respondent education that the samples answering the two questions are not completely comparable. And, most importantly, we expect to see variations that represent the effects of regional differences in economic conditions and other factors affecting levels policy support.

We know from examination of the regional unemployment rates that the different regions are not undergoing equivalent changes in economic fortunes over the years. The effects of these differing economic trajectories can be discerned in the changes in relative standing in the tables only to a limited extent, however. Perhaps the best examples of this are found in the surveys over the

period between the two recessions, during which levels policy support in Ontario appears to become stronger relative to other regions, seeming to reflect the strong economic growth there, while British Columbia's sluggish recovery from the earlier recession appears to be reflected in a drop in levels policy support there relative to other regions.

With respect to possible effects of the rate of flow on levels policy support, inspection of the regional averages for the "too much immigration" question in Table 2, if anything, would seem to suggest positive effects. That suggestion comes from the Environics surveys between 1987 and 1990, where three out of the four surveys show positive correlations between flow and levels policy support. In contrast, in the "too few, too many" surveys in Table 3, there are significant negative correlations in every year from 1992 to 1998, suggestive of possible negative effects on levels policy support in regions with greater flow rates.

So, we have a suggestion from the "too much immigration" surveys that levels policy support was actually stronger in regions with relatively high flow rates in the late 1980s, not confirmed by the "too few, too many" surveys, and a suggestion of the opposite relation between flow and support from 1992 onwards from the "too few, too many" surveys but not evident in the "too much immigration" surveys. However, this is without controlling for the effects of factors such as regional differences in unemployment rates and education, both known to be strongly associated with levels policy support.

When we conduct analyses that attempt to separate the possible effects of immigration flow rate from those of other factors -- multiple regressions predicting levels policy support from flow rate when gender, education, age and regional unemployment rate are already in the equation -- the results for the two series of surveys become somewhat more concordant. This can be seen by examining the beta values for flow near the bottom of Tables 2 and 3. (The complete equations are presented in Tables A-7 and A-8 in the Appendix.)

Of the three "too much immigration" surveys in which simple correlations suggested a positive relation between flow and levels policy support, in only one

is there a significant positive beta value for flow. Moreover, in several other of the "too much immigration" surveys, significant negative beta values for flow are observed, suggesting that there is an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support when the effects of other factors are controlled. Looking at the "too few, too many" surveys, we see significant negative beta values for flow in every year from 1988 to 1998, except for 1990 (the same year as the sole instance of a significant positive beta value in the "too much immigration" surveys).

A set of secondary analyses looked at the relations between levels policy support and flow rates when respondents are divided into two sub-samples according to whether they were born in Canada or elsewhere. The results of these analyses, presented in Tables A-9 and A-10 in the Appendix, show a high degree of similarity between the immigrant and non-immigrant sub-samples with respect to the relation between flow and levels policy support. This would suggest that, whatever the dynamics underlying that relation, they are not just affecting the attitudes of those born in Canada but affect levels policy support among members of the immigrant community in a similar direction. (Readers should note that birthplace data was not available for all surveys, leading to the absence of such analyses for the 1981 and 1983 "too much immigration" surveys and for 1995 and 1996 on the "too few, too many" measure.)

Table A-11 in the Appendix shows the results for analyses looking at relations between immigration flow and acceptance of "non-white" immigrants in the Environics surveys which asked this question. On this measure of attitude toward immigrants, we see somewhat different results from those with respect to levels policy support.

When the analyses do not control for the effects of other factors, the only significant correlations between flow and acceptance of "non-white" immigrants are positive -- that is, suggest acceptance is greater in regions where the per capita flow rate is greater. These occur in the 1994 and 1998 surveys and when we combine the data from all the surveys asking this question.

In the regression analyses controlling for the effects of other factors, there is evidence of a negative relation between flow and acceptance of "non-white" immigrants in the 1991 and 1992 surveys but evidence of a positive relation when data from all the surveys are combined. It should be noted that the analyses of the "too much immigration" question showed no evidence of its responses being related to flow in those same 1991 and 1992 surveys. Further, in the surveys in which there was a negative relation between flow and levels policy support as measured by that question, there was no evidence of a similar negative relation between flow and acceptance of "non-white" immigrants. Readers should also note that 1991 was the first year of the recession and coincided, along with the appearance of the negative relation with flow, with the appearance of a similar and more persistent negative relation with regional unemployment rates, not evident in analyses of the "too much immigration" question.

To summarize to this point, the analyses clearly suggest that, when differences in factors such as education and unemployment rates are controlled, there is an inverse relation between immigration flow and levels policy support. In analyses without such controls, we see evidence of an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support in all the recent "too few, too many" surveys and not between 1988 and 1990, but this pattern is not confirmed in the "too much immigration" surveys. However, given the much larger sample sizes for the "too few, too many" question than for the "too much immigration" question in recent years and for other reasons which we will discuss later, we will assume that the "too few, too many" results are a more reliable estimate of recent regional patterns and conclude that the inverse relation between flow and levels policy support is present in the more recent time period even when regional differences in other factors are not considered. As well, our findings suggest these relations between flow and levels policy support are equally present among members of the immigrant community as they are among the Canadian-born. With respect to attitudes toward "non-white" immigrants, we see evidence of an inverse relation with flow only during the onset of the 1991 recession and a positive

relation with flow overall, a pattern quite different from that observed on the measure of levels policy support in the same surveys.

A different regional breakdown

So, when we look at our survey results broken down into six broad regions of the country, we see that, in recent years at least, levels policy support has been weaker in regions receiving greater per capita immigration flow. But what happens if we look at a finer breakdown that enables examining attitudes in the cities where the immigration flow is most concentrated -- like Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal -- and compare them to other regions?

In our next analyses, we will look at a recent sub-set of the series of the surveys examined in the six-region analyses, using a different geography and incorporating several measures of other attitudes and perceptions related to levels policy support, with a view to shedding further light on the relations between the rate of immigration and the public's attitudes.

The geography we will employ for this analysis defines seven major immigrant-receiving regions on the basis of intended destinations of immigrants arriving during the 1995-97 period, plus an "other" category containing the remaining regions of the country. As is shown in Table 4, these seven regions -- Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, the major urban centres (greater than 100,000 population) of Alberta and of Ontario, and the smaller (less than 100,000 population) urban and rural areas of Ontario and of British Columbia) -- comprising two-thirds of the Canadian population, received eleven-twelfths of the immigration flow between 1995 and 1997, while the "other" regions, with one-third of the population, were the destinations of one-twelfth of new arrivals. The unevenness of current settlement patterns is more markedly evident when one considers the proportions of the flow destined for Toronto and Vancouver. The two cities, together, account for just over a fifth of existing residents but are the destination of over three-fifths of new immigrants. These ratios of proportion of flow to proportion of population are, of course, indexed by the regional per capita immigration rates shown in the third column of Table 4.

Table 4. Proportion of total population, proportion of total 1995-97 immigration flow, flow per capita, proportion of Canadian-born in population, flow per capita Canadian-born, and flow per capita foreign-born, by region.

	% total pop	% 95-97 flow	flow per 100 total pop	% c-b in pop	flow per 100 c-b pop	flow per 100 f-b pop
toronto	15.1	44.1	2.24	58	3.86	5.33
vancouver	6.6	19.3	2.24	65	3.45	6.40
combined	21.7	63.4	2.24	60	3.73	5.60
montreal	11.6	10.4	.69	82	.84	3.83
alta urban	5.9	5.5	.71	80	.89	3.55
ont urban	12.5	5.0	.31	81	.38	1.63
ont rural	10.2	5.0	.38	89	.43	3.45
b c rural	5.1	2.2	.33	86	.38	2.36
combined	45.3	28.1	.47	83	.63	2.76
major 7	67.0	91.5	1.05	76	1.38	4.38
other	33.0	8.5	.20	95	.21	4.00
canada	100.0	100.0	.77	83.4	.92	4.64

Note, here, how the flow to the seven major immigrant-receiving regions is five times that going to "other" regions and the rate of flow to Toronto and Vancouver is eleven times as great, when expressed in terms considering the size of the receiving population.

The fourth and fifth columns in Table 4 show the proportion of the local population born in Canada (column 4) and a per capita flow index comprising a ratio of the regional proportion of the current flow to the regional size of the Canadian-born population (i.e., column 3 divided by column 4). In other words, while column 3 describes the flow to the region in terms relative to the size of the local population, column 5 describes it in a way that considers just the size of the Canadian-born portion of the local population. This rate of flow would be the one to bear in mind when considering the effects of levels policy on relations between Canadian-born residents and members of the immigrant communities. Note, here, that while remaining virtually unchanged from the rate relative to the total local population (in column 3) for the regions in the "other" category, and showing only slight increases in the five major immigrant-receiving regions other than Toronto and Vancouver, in those two cities expressing the rate in these terms results in a substantial increase in its size -- for the two cities combined, the rate of current immigration relative to the size of the local Canadian-born community is 18 times higher than that for the "other" category and six times that for the five other major immigrant-receiving regions.

The right-most column in Table 4 is analogous to the adjacent column but here the current immigration rate is presented relative to the size of the local foreign-born population. Here, the regional differences are far smaller than when the rate is expressed in other ways but the rates for Vancouver and Toronto are still substantially greater than those for other regions. This way of expressing the rate of immigration is of interest in at least two ways. First, to the extent that new immigrants look to other members of the local immigrant community for support in the integration process, these figures will provide some indication of the stress new arrivals may be placing on that community's

resources. Second, since new immigrants may compete economically with other foreign-born local residents more than with those that are Canadian-born, the numbers in this column will bear some relation to the degree to which immigrants already present in the community may perceive an economic threat from new arrivals. Either or both of these factors might influence levels policy support among foreign-born residents.

Important regional differences exist between the seven major immigrant-receiving regions with respect to age and education. Here, as shown in Table 5, the differences are primarily between the larger urban centres compared to the smaller and rural communities, with the larger communities tending to have populations that are, on average, younger and better-educated. So, again, as was the case in the first analysis looking at broader regional differences, these factors would predict the most positive attitudes toward immigration to be in the communities receiving the greatest proportions, per capita, of the current immigration flow.

Levels policy support and perceived effects of immigration

We will look here at the results for a series of surveys conducted by the Angus Reid Group between January 1996 and October 1998. There were ten surveys in all over this period which contained questions related to immigration, each of which interviewed about 1500 adult Canadians, yielding a combined total sample size in excess of 15,000. In order to provide an accurate picture of attitudes within the given regions, where possible we will combine the results of all surveys asking the same question to increase the regional sample sizes. Thus, while analyses of a question asked in only one survey may rely on the responses of about 100 Vancouver residents and, thus, be sensitive only to fairly over-powering effects, an analysis looking at a question asked in all ten of these surveys will have responses of over a 1000 Vancouver residents and be far more powerful.

Among the major immigrant-receiving regions within Canada, we see significant variations between them with respect to levels policy support and

Table 5. Level of education and age of survey respondents, by region
1996-97 Angus Reid surveys.

	(sample size)	education	age
toronto	(2201)	3.6	41.6
vancouver	(1012)	3.5	43.4
combined	(3213)	3.6	42.2
montreal	(1756)	3.3	42.1
alta urban	(837)	3.4	41.4
ont urban	(1922)	3.4	44.0
ont rural	(1576)	2.9	46.9
b c rural	(777)	3.0	46.1
combined	(6869)	3.2	44.1
major 7	(10082)	3.3	43.5
other	(5110)	2.9	44.5
canada	(15191)	3.2	43.8

Note. Education is coded: 1 = < h.s.; 2 = h.s.; 3 = > h.s., no univ.;
4 = some univ.; 5 = univ. degree; 6 = graduate degree.

f-values:

	education	age
8 regions	81.54***	23.28***
tor & van, major 5, other	205.18***	22.40***
major 7, other	279.46***	13.78***

perceptions regarding the effects of immigration. Similarly, the numerous other regions and communities, which receive relatively small proportions of the current immigration flow, also show differences from each other in attitudes and perceptions. However, there are also important differences between those two groups of regions in their attitudes and perceptions, differences that are important in that they may themselves reflect indirect policy effects and in that attitudes in the major immigrant-receiving regions may disproportionately affect immigrant integration and policy implementation, due to the greater immigrant presence in those communities.

Looking at the four immigration-related measures tracked in these surveys over the past three years, we see that the differences between the regions receiving the lion's share of new immigration and other regions are not in the same direction in all cases (see Table 6). We might have expected to find, for example, that residents of the communities in which new immigrants tend to settle would be more aware of the benefits of immigration and, hence, also more supportive of levels policy, compared to the residents of other areas, especially since a far greater proportion of survey respondents in the former group would themselves be immigrants and thus tend to hold more favourable views of immigration.

What we find, however, is that while residents of the immigrant-receiving regions do have more favourable perceptions regarding the effects of immigration on employment opportunities and on culture, the two groups do not differ in the favourability of their perceptions of the effects on their communities and, as shown in the earlier six-region analysis, levels policy support is significantly greater in the regions receiving relatively few new immigrants, than in the communities to which most immigrants go. Thus, the findings suggest that the segment of the population more directly affected by the level of immigration is less likely to support that policy and no more likely to perceive immigration as having a positive impact on the community, despite having more favourable perceptions of its impact on employment and culture, compared to residents of other regions. This result is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that the

Table 6. Levels policy support and perceived effects on employment, culture and the community -- by region (Angus Reid January 1996 to October 1998 surveys combined).

region	(sample size)	levels policy support	perceived effects on: employment	culture	community
toronto	(2218)	3.1	2.7	3.5	3.4
vancouver	(1017)	2.9	2.7	3.4	3.2
combined	(3235)	3.0	2.7	3.5	3.4
montreal	(1766)	3.2	2.6	3.2	3.4
alta urban	(840)	3.1	2.6	3.5	3.4
ont urban	(1933)	2.9	2.5	3.3	3.3
ont rural	(1582)	2.8	2.4	3.2	3.2
b c rural	(780)	2.8	2.5	3.2	3.2
combined	(6901)	3.0	2.5	3.2	3.3
major 7	(10136)	3.0	2.6	3.3	3.3
other	(5129)	3.1	2.5	3.2	3.3
canada	(15265)	3.04	2.56	3.29	3.32
f-values:					
8 regions		12.84***	9.03***	16.66***	6.73***
tor & van, major 5, other		12.30***	22.91***	38.20***	1.77
major 7, other		23.46***	4.71*	18.75***	1.15

Note. Mid-points are 4 for levels policy support and 3 for other questions.

Data for perceived effect on community collected only in surveys since June 1997 -- hence, sample sizes are only 60% as large.

observed more favourable perceptions regarding effects on employment and culture would be expected to produce greater rather than less levels policy support, especially since the major immigrant-receiving communities have populations which tend to be younger, better-educated, and composed to a greater extent of immigrants, compared to other regions.

When we look at analyses separating respondents into immigrant and Canadian-born sub-samples, two interesting findings emerge. The first, shown in Table 7, is that immigrants living in the major immigrant-receiving communities show less levels policy support than do foreign-born residents of other regions. The second is that the more favourable perceptions of effects on employment and culture in the immigrant-receiving regions, in the overall analysis, turn out to be entirely due to the responses of the immigrant populations within those regions -- no differences are evident between the perceptions of Canadian-born respondents residing within the immigrant-receiving regions and the perceptions of Canadian-born respondents in other regions (see Table 8).

So, whereas the overall results might have suggested that being in a community where one had the opportunity to see first-hand how immigrants start new businesses, increase the demand for the products and services of Canadian companies, and add to the richness of our cultural diversity, would explain the more favourable perceptions of the employment and cultural effects of immigration in the immigrant-receiving regions, this turns out not to be the case. The secondary analyses reveal that these more favourable regional perceptions are simply due to the fact that immigrants comprise a larger proportion of the survey samples in those regions than in others and immigrants are stronger believers in the benefits of immigration. And, even among the immigrant population, we find less support for levels policy in the major immigrant-receiving regions than elsewhere.

Perceptions of levels policy

A question that comes to mind is "How similar or different are the regional populations' perceptions of the current level of immigration and, what role, if

Table 7. Levels policy support and perceived effects on employment, culture and the community -- by region (Angus Reid June 1997, March, July and October 1998 surveys, combined) -- foreign-born respondents only.

region	(sample size)	levels policy support	perceived effects on: employment	culture	community
toronto	(271)	3.5	2.9	3.7	3.6
vancouver	(109)	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.4
combined	(380)	3.4	3.0	3.6	3.5
montreal	(83)	4.0	3.1	3.8	3.8
alta urban	(57)	3.8	3.0	3.8	3.8
ont urban	(125)	3.7	3.0	3.6	3.7
ont rural	(66)	3.6	3.0	3.6	3.3
b c rural	(37)	2.9	2.7	3.2	3.2
combined	(369)	3.7	3.0	3.6	3.6
major 7	(749)	3.5	3.0	3.6	3.6
other	(120)	3.9	3.0	3.6	3.7
canada	(869)	3.60	2.98	3.62	3.58
f-values:					
8 regions		3.33**	0.44	1.55	3.07**
tor & van, major 5, other		5.19**	0.12	0.11	1.58
major 7, other		5.67*	0.02	0.05	2.24

Note. Mid-points are 4 for levels policy support and 3 for other questions.

Table 8. Levels policy support and perceived effects on employment, culture and the community -- by region (Angus Reid June 1997, March, July and October 1998 surveys, combined) -- Canadian-born respondents and interviewers only.

region	(sample size)	levels policy support	perceived effects on: employment	culture	community
toronto	(378)	3.0	2.6	3.4	3.3
vancouver	(261)	2.9	2.6	3.1	3.1
combined	(639)	2.9	2.6	3.3	3.2
montreal	(546)	3.2	2.6	3.1	3.4
alta urban	(222)	3.1	2.5	3.5	3.3
ont urban	(481)	2.8	2.4	3.2	3.2
ont rural	(438)	2.9	2.4	3.2	3.3
b c rural	(202)	2.9	2.6	3.3	3.3
combined	(1890)	3.0	2.5	3.2	3.3
major 7	(2529)	3.0	2.5	3.2	3.3
other	(1683)	3.2	2.5	3.2	3.3
canada	(4212)	3.06	2.53	3.24	3.28
f-values:					
8 regions		5.12***	1.53	3.78***	2.11*
tor & van, major 5, other		8.39***	1.20	1.06	1.91
major 7, other		16.11***	0.02	0.24	0.77

Note. Mid-points are 4 for levels policy support and 3 for other questions.

any, do those perceptions play in determining levels policy support and the regional differences therein?" Perhaps residents of regions where immigrants tend to settle are more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants because they think the level of immigration is greater than is the impression of those who reside in other parts of the country.

Respondents in one of the Angus Reid surveys (September 1996) were asked what they thought the current level of immigration to Canada was. Overall, the results suggested there is no correlation between how many immigrants Canadians think are coming and whether they feel that number is too many, about right or too few. As the bottom line of Table 9 shows, the average estimates made by respondents expressing each of these three opinions are virtually identical.

One would expect people who think current immigration numbers in the hundreds of thousands would be more likely to say there are "too many" immigrants, compared to people who think the current level is only a few tens of thousands. Yet, the national results would suggest this is not the case. A partial explanation of this apparent lack of rationality emerges when we look at the regional analysis.

The results detailed in Table 9 show that there were significant regional variations in estimates of the level of immigration: the actual level is severely under-estimated in all regions, as has been the case in all surveys asking such a question, but the estimated level of immigration is greater in the regions where most immigrants settle than it is in other regions, and greatest in Toronto and Vancouver. So, the lower levels policy support in the immigrant-receiving regions is accompanied by greater estimates of the level of immigration, when we compare the average regional responses on each measure.

We would also expect to see a similar relation between the perceived level of immigration and levels policy support within the different regions. However, the results suggest this is the case only in the "other" category and, in the immigrant-receiving regions, the tendency, if any, is for greater levels policy support to be associated with greater estimates of the level of immigration.

Table 9. Estimates of the number of immigrants (000s) by region and opinion on the number of immigrants (Angus Reid survey, September 1996).

	too many	about right	too few	correlation	all
toronto	158 (94)	168 (93)	160 (15)	.02	163 (202)
vancouver	151 (45)	177 (34)	115 (4)	.04	160 (83)
combined	156 (139)	171 (127)	151 (18)	.03	162 (285)
montreal	123 (58)	145 (89)	109 (14)	.02	134 (162)
alberta urban	148 (25)	141 (46)	189 (6)	.08	147 (78)
ontario urban	161 (89)	152 (81)	212 (7)	.03	159 (177)
ontario rural	133 (78)	153 (59)	185 (4)	.15t	143 (141)
b.c. rural	144 (41)	135 (23)	175 (5)	.02	143 (69)
combined	142 (292)	147 (298)	159 (37)	.04	146 (626)
major 7	146 (431)	154 (425)	157 (55)	.03	151 (911)
other	140 (212)	124 (222)	130 (47)	-.08t	131 (480)
all	144 (643)	144 (647)	145 (102)	-.01	144 (1391)

f-values:

	8 regions	3 regions	major 7, other
region	4.81***	12.64***	17.50***
levels policy support	.10	.05	.06
region X l.p.s	1.51t	2.07t	3.12*

This puzzling pattern within the immigrant-receiving regions may in part reflect a tendency of the immigrant members of those communities, who also tend to express greater levels policy support, to be more aware of the actual current statistics on immigration levels, whereas the Canadian-born residents, less supportive of levels policy, are less knowledgable regarding the actual numbers and, as everywhere, their guesses are under-estimates. However, since this particular survey did not collect data regarding the respondent's place of birth, this possibility cannot be explored here.

What these results certainly do suggest is that the public decision making process regarding levels policy is not characterized by precise mathematical computations. Rather, the results suggest that most people are not particularly concerned about knowing what the exact numbers are but decide their levels policy preference based on their impressions of how things are going in their community and the economy, in conjunction with their beliefs about the effects of immigration and a general sense of whether the current levels are high or low.

The regional differences in estimates of the level of immigration suggest that the uneven settlement patterns of current immigrants may lead to a greater tendency for the residents of the major immigrant-receiving regions to have the general impression that levels are high. This is probably due, at least in part, to greater regional media and public interest in immigration issues leading to more accurate knowledge of the exact numbers. With respect to explaining the regional differences in levels policy support, we can only say that residents of the regions receiving the bulk of current immigrants do, on average, give higher estimates of the level of immigration and this may contribute to some extent to their tendency to show less levels policy support, compared to residents of other regions, but the evidence here is very limited.

Desired population size

Another question related to levels policy support, included in the June 1997 survey, asked respondents whether they would like to see their province have

a larger, smaller, or about the same size population. The results showed two regional differences of interest (see Table 10).

The first of these was that residents of regions to which relatively few current immigrants go tend to be more likely to want to see an increase in the size of their province's population, compared to the residents of the major immigrant-receiving regions. A notable exception to this pattern was the case of Montreal (and possibly also Vancouver and urban Alberta, though in those two cases the single-survey regional sample sizes are too small to draw any firm conclusions).

The second finding of interest regards comparing the opinions regarding desired population size of foreign-born to Canadian-born residents. Here there was a notable difference between members of the immigrant communities in Vancouver and Toronto compared to foreign-born residents of other regions. While members of the immigrant communities in other regions tended to be more in favour of population growth than their Canadian-born counterparts, the reverse was true for Vancouver and Toronto, where support for a larger population was lower among foreign-born residents than among both the Canadian-born residents of those cities and members of immigrant communities in other regions. Note the correspondence between these results and those for levels policy among foreign-born respondents.

Family reunification

Further information regarding regional differences in the salience of issues related to immigration can be deduced from a series of questions asking respondents to rate the performance of the immigration program in several different areas. These were included in two surveys in January and March 1998.

Two questions related to performance in the area of family reunification. The first was just a general rating of the program's performance in helping to reunite family members. These ratings showed a remarkable uniformity across the various regions (see Table 11). The only regional variations of note were with respect to the relation between these ratings and levels policy support.

Table 10. Beliefs about desired size of provincial population and their correlation with levels policy support, by region and birthplace (Angus Reid survey, June 1997).

	desired size score				(sample sizes)		
	c-b	imm	all	correlation	c-b	imm	all
toronto	3.2	3.1	3.2	.40***	(148)	(74)	(221)
vancouver	3.4	3.1	3.4	.39***	(74)	(25)	(99)
combined	3.3	3.1	3.2	.38***	(222)	(99)	(320)
montreal	3.4	3.7	3.5	.25***	(148)	(25)	(173)
alta urban	3.4	3.5	3.4	.32**	(69)	(14)	(83)
ont urban	3.0	3.2	3.1	.39***	(159)	(35)	(194)
ont rural	3.2	3.3	3.2	.16*	(138)	(19)	(157)
b c rural	3.2	4.0	3.3	.54***	(73)	(10)	(84)
combined	3.3	3.4	3.3	.30***	(587)	(103)	(690)
major 7	3.3	3.3	3.3	.33***	(809)	(202)	(1011)
other	3.4	3.6	3.5	.35***	(466)	(36)	(501)
canada	3.3	3.3	3.3	.33***	(1274)	(238)	(1512)

F-values:

	8 regions	3 regions	major 7, other
region	7.01***	9.12***	16.70***
c-b vs imm	.54	.32	.14
interaction	2.22*	5.04**	1.37

Table 11. Average program performance ratings regarding reuniting families, sponsorship obligations, refugee claim determination, deporting refused claimamts, and criminality screening, and their correlations with levels policy support, by region (Angus Reid surveys, January & March 1998).

		reunification		sponsorship		refugee claims		deportations		criminality	
region	(n)	rating	corr.	rating	corr.	rating	corr.	rating	corr.	rating	corr.
toronto	(407)	3.1	-.13**	2.4	.28***	2.7	.03	2.1	.21***	4.3	.25***
vancouver	(195)	3.1	-.01	2.4	.28***	2.4	.16*	1.9	.05	3.7	.21**
combined	(602)	3.1	-.09*	2.4	.27***	2.6	.07t	2.0	.16***	4.1	.25***
montreal	(371)	3.1	.23***	3.2	.12*	3.0	.11*	3.1	.01	6.4	.05
alta urban	(178)	3.1	-.10	2.6	.16*	2.8	.05	2.4	.15*	4.6	.22**
ont urban	(372)	3.1	-.08	2.4	.25***	2.7	.07	2.3	.22***	4.5	.28***
ont rural	(277)	3.1	.06	2.6	.18**	2.8	.12*	2.3	.18**	4.6	.27***
b c rural	(177)	3.2	-.06	2.6	.21**	2.8	-.11	2.2	-.03	4.2	.14t
combined	(1375)	3.1	.03	2.7	.20***	2.8	.08**	2.5	.13***	5.0	.19***
major 7	(1977)	3.1	-.01	2.6	.22***	2.8	.08***	2.4	.14***	4.7	.20***
other	(1051)	3.1	.14***	3.1	.24***	3.0	.10***	2.8	.01	5.7	.10**
canada	(3028)	3.1	.04*	2.8	.23***	2.8	.09***	2.5	.10***	5.1	.17***

Note. Scale mid-point is 3 except for criminality screening where the mid-point is 6.

f-values:

	reunification	sponsorship	refugee claims	deportations	criminality
8 regions	.66	41.80***	15.18***	51.91***	58.02***
3 regions	.99	83.30***	32.90***	103.07***	88.20***
major 7, other	1.83	122.89***	38.75***	130.93***	111.76***

Performance ratings in this area showed a positive relation with levels policy support in Montreal and in regions receiving relatively few immigrants, a negative relation in Toronto, and there was no evidence of either positive or negative relations in the other immigrant-receiving regions. Given this was the program area receiving the most favourable ratings (an average of 3.1 on the five-point scale), the positive relations with levels policy support in the regions where that support is relatively strong are noteworthy.

The second question related to family reunification rated performance in ensuring sponsorship obligations are fulfilled, an area receiving a somewhat lower average rating (2.8). Here, except in Montreal, performance was rated as less satisfactory in regions receiving substantial proportions of the current flow, when compared to other regions, with performance ratings by Toronto and Vancouver residents being lower than those by the residents of other major immigrant-receiving regions (see Table 11). These ratings were related to levels policy support in all regions, perhaps a little more strongly so in Vancouver and Toronto than in the other immigrant-receiving regions.

Processing refugee claims

Two ratings regarded the refugee determination process -- one rated the handling of claims (average rating = 2.8) while the second rated performance in the area of deporting those whose claims were unsuccessful (average rating = 2.5). On both questions the regional pattern again showed the most positive ratings occurring in Montreal and in regions receiving relatively few new immigrants, while ratings in the immigrant-receiving regions were less favourable, especially in Vancouver and Toronto (see Table 11). Overall, both sets of ratings showed only weak associations with levels policy support in general but, in Toronto and other parts of Ontario the correlations were significant with regard to the deportation issue. With respect to the Vancouver results, it should be noted that relatively few of current refugee claims are processed in that region.

Criminality screening

Two questions rated performance in the area of screening new arrivals for criminality, one with respect to immigrants and one regarding refugees. Since the results were virtually identical on both, our analysis combines them into a two-item scale with scores ranging from two to ten. Again the average rating was substantially below the mid-point of "fair", with ratings being most favourable in Montreal and in the regions receiving relatively few new immigrants, and the ratings being less favourable in Vancouver and Toronto than in the other immigrant-receiving regions (see Table 11). In this case, however, the performance ratings in Vancouver were appreciably less favourable than those in Toronto and by far the lowest of any region. (It should be noted that this indication of concerns regarding immigrant criminality among Vancouver residents comes from surveys that were conducted about six months prior to a more recent spate of stories on that issue carried by the media there.) Regarding the relations between these ratings and levels policy support, these were generally stronger in the immigrant-receiving regions, excepting Montreal, than in those receiving relatively few immigrants.

Factors summarizing program ratings

A useful way of summarizing the results for the program ratings is provided by subjecting them to a factor analysis and then, after constructing summary measures representing those factors, examining the regional differences in scores on those measures and in how those scores relate to levels policy support. (Data from a January 1999 survey is included to increase the power of these analyses.)

The factor analysis suggests two clear factors are present in the program ratings (see Table A-12 in the Appendix). The first and strongest of these is marked by ratings dealing with screening for criminality, deportation of those whose refugee claims have been rejected, enforcement of sponsorship obligations, screening for health problems, and selecting skilled and temporary workers. The common theme is one of selecting immigrants and enforcing regulations in a manner that will protect Canadian society, so we will label this the "protect residents"

factor. The second and weaker factor is marked by ratings regarding helping reunify families and aiding refugees in overseas camps. Since these items clearly deal with acting to the benefit of newcomers, we will call this the "help immigrants" factor.

Comparing composite measures, created by summing the ratings on the items comprising the two factors, across the different regions, shows that ratings on the "help immigrants" factor are not very different (see Table 12). However, ratings on the "protect residents" factor are much less favourable in the major immigrant-receiving regions (except Montreal), than in other regions. Those who live in the major immigrant-receiving regions are more likely to perceive problems in the aspects of program performance which are supposed to ensure that newcomers are honest, healthy, hard-working citizens who do not commit crimes or increase the burden on welfare and medical services.

Further differences are found when we look at how scores on the two factors are associated with levels policy support. Here, whether respondents reside in regions with relatively high or low rates of immigration makes a substantial difference and, further, the nature of that difference depends on which factor is being examined.

Overall, there is a much weaker association between ratings on the "help immigrants" factor and levels policy support. As Table 12 shows, those who say there are "too many" immigrants do not differ very much from those who say there are "too few" or "about the right number", in how they rate program performance on the two items comprising that factor. However, this is much more the case in the major immigrant-receiving regions. In the low flow regions and particularly in Quebec, there is a correlation between these ratings and levels policy support, consisting of a stronger tendency for those who favour less immigration to give relatively unfavourable ratings on this factor, compared to those who favour maintaining or increasing the current level.

Ratings on the "protect residents" factor tend to be much more strongly related to levels policy support. Those favouring less immigration give the program less favourable ratings on this factor. But, while also true for

Table 12. Program rating factor scores and correlations with levels policy support by region -- Angus Reid 1998 and 1999 surveys.

region	(n)	"help immigrants" score	"help immigrants" correlation	"protect residents" score	"protect residents" correlation
toronto	(677)	6.1	-.06	19.8	.31***
vancouver	(286)	6.0	.02	18.5	.34***
combined	(963)	6.0	-.04	19.4	.32***
montreal	(528)	6.2	.23***	25.3	.15***
alberta urban	(259)	6.1	.06	21.4	.28***
ontario urban	(565)	6.0	-.05	20.7	.31***
ontario rural	(472)	6.0	.08t	21.4	.32***
b c rural	(307)	6.0	-.08	19.8	.20***
combined	(2130)	6.1	.06**	22.0	.26***
major 7	(3093)	6.1	.03t	21.2	.27***
other	(1450)	6.1	.15***	24.3	.18***
canada	(4543)	6.1	.07***	22.2	.25***

f-values:		
8 regions	.69	106.94***
3 regions	.59	218.01***
major 7, other	1.00	291.95***

residents of low flow regions, this relation is much stronger in the major immigrant-receiving regions.

These results suggest that levels policy support may be affected in three ways by perceptions of problems in these program areas on the part of the residents of regions where flow rates are relatively high. First, while their perceptions of how the program is working to help immigrants and overseas refugees are not very different from the perceptions of residents of low flow regions, those perceptions of those good things that the program does appear to have little effect on their levels policy support, whereas those perceptions do have an impact in low flow regions. Second, the perceptions held by the residents of major immigrant-receiving regions on the "protect residents" factor are more negative -- compared to the residents of low flow regions, they perceive there to be greater problems in those program areas. And, third, program performance on the "protect residents" factor appears to have more of an impact on levels policy support among residents of major immigrant-receiving regions than among residents of low flow regions. In other words, not only are residents of major immigrant-receiving regions more likely to think the program is doing a poor job of, say, screening out criminals, but whether or not they think that is more likely to affect their levels policy support, whereas perceiving a problem in that area is less likely to affect how a resident of a low flow region feels about the current level of immigration.

This pattern of results makes considerable sense in view of how the immediacy of the policy consequences represented by the "protect residents" factor would differ for residents of major immigrant-receiving regions, compared to residents of regions receiving relatively few immigrants.

For residents of major immigrant-receiving regions, there will be a much greater awareness of any problems occurring in these program areas, primarily because of a much greater coverage of those stories by the local media (along with possible word-of-mouth or direct involvement effects). Added to that greater awareness will be greater feelings of being affected by those events, a greater sense that it is "my community" where the crimes are taking place or

whose social service budgets are being strained or where those "dishonest" refugee claimants are coming to live. Thus, it is not surprising that awareness of actual negative policy consequences in those areas, along with unfavourable misperceptions of such policy consequences produced by negatively-biased media coverage, will be greater in major immigrant-receiving regions and will matter more to the residents of those regions when they decide how they feel about the level of immigration. Whereas for residents of low flow regions, they are to a large extent problems that are occurring elsewhere and though they still matter, they matter less.

Top-of-mind in October 1998

The final question we will look at here is the standard question with which Angus Reid open their survey interviews, asking respondents on which issues Canada's leaders should be focusing their attention. We will look at the data for this question from the October 1998 survey.

Nationally, immigration is mentioned in response to this question by only 2% of the sample, a result that is in line with the historical average for questions of this type. It should be noted that mentioning immigration as a top-of-mind issue does not <u>always</u> mean it is being seen as a problem. However, those who do mention it are far more likely to feel that current levels are too high than those who do not.

When we look at the regional pattern, shown in Table 13, we see that those likely to mention immigration as a top-of-mind issue are residents of regions receiving substantial proportions of the current immigration flow rather than regions receiving relatively few new immigrants. While it is not surprising that immigration would be a top-of-mind issue more often in the immigrant-receiving regions, when we look at them individually the results in Vancouver are obviously way out of line with the others -- 12% mentioning immigration, compared to a maximum of 4% in the other regions (and that 4% number is for the smaller B.C. communities, which is probably no coincidence). While in the normal national survey, the Vancouver sample is relatively small and would have a margin of error

Table 13. Mention of immigration as a top of mind issue, by region (Angus Reid survey, October 1998).

	(sample size) weighted	unweighted	per cent mentioning immigration
toronto	(251)	(204)	2
vancouver	(167)	(300)	12
combined	(418)	(504)	6
montreal	(195)	(184)	2
alta urban	(90)	(79)	3
ont urban	(198)	(162)	2
ont rural	(193)	(159)	1
b c rural	(47)	(87)	4
combined	(723)	(671)	2
major 7	(1141)	(1175)	3
other	(559)	(525)	0
canada	(1700)	(1700)	2

f-values:

8 regions	11.78***
3 regions	17.99***
major 7, other	15.16***

large enough that we might not want to draw any firm conclusions from a result like this, in this particular survey CIC had Angus Reid over-sample Vancouver to ensure that we had statistically reliable results there. Hence, we can conclude with a high degree of certainty that Vancouver residents were far more likely to mention immigration as a top-of-mind issue in that survey, than were the residents of any of the other regions.

Respondents could mention more than one issue and further analysis looked at what other issues were mentioned by individuals who saw immigration as a priority issue. However, in contrast to the 36 respondents out of 300 in Vancouver, only 19 of the 1400 respondents in other regions mentioned immigration, meaning that we can only compare the Vancouver respondents to other regions in general and cannot look at any of the others individually in this analysis. What we find when we look at other issues mentioned, is that only one issue is mentioned more often by those Vancouver residents who mention immigration than by those who do not (see Table 14). While only 3% of other Vancouver residents mentioned it, comparable to the 4% national average, 22% of those mentioning immigration as a top-of-mind issue also mentioned the issue of crime. There was no statistically reliable evidence of linkage between the two issues in responses to this question in other parts of the country but that result must be qualified by the small number of mentions of immigration by residents of other regions.

To recapitulate, our analysis shows that: 1) Vancouver residents mention immigration more often as a top-of-mind issue than do residents of other regions; 2) that residents of Vancouver who mention immigration are more likely to also mention crime than are residents of Vancouver who do not mention immigration; and 3) Vancouver residents who mention immigration are more likely to mention crime as well than are residents of other regions who mention immigration. However, our analyses do not tell us that residents of other regions who mention immigration are not more likely to mention crime than other residents of those regions. Too few residents of those other regions mentioned immigration for us to say anything much about linkage with other issues in those regions. What our

Table 14. Mentions of other issues and levels policy support in Vancouver, comparing respondents who did or did not mention immigration as a top-of-mind issue -- Angus Reid survey, October 1998.

	mention of immigration				
other issues	no	yes	no	yes	
	#	#	%	%	
value of dollar	22	0	8	0	
gov't, deficit, taxes	93	11	35	31	
economy	68	11	26	31	
jobs	67	5	25	14	
medicare	56	5	21	14	
national unity	55	4	21	11	
poverty, soc. services	23	1	9	3	
crime	8	8	3	22	***
schools	25	1	10	3	
levels policy					
too many	115	20	44	56	
about right / d.k.	132	14	50	39	
too few	17	2	6	6	
total	264	36			

*** probability of this difference in proportions occurring just by chance is less than one in 10,000 (Fisher's Exact Test)

analyses do imply, though, is that to the extent that the crime issue is linked to immigration in those other regions, it is not linked as strongly as in Vancouver.

Trends

As was noted earlier, these surveys confirm that levels policy support continues to recover the ground lost during the recession of the early 1990s and, if anything, this recovery seems to have picked up speed in the most recent surveys (see Figures 2 and 3 and Table A-13 in the Appendix).

This positive trend in levels policy support appears to be driven primarily by a weakening of the belief that immigration increases unemployment as the unemployment rate continues to decline. On the other hand, the most recent surveys have also suggested an increase in the favourability of the public's perceptions of the effects of immigration on culture and on the community.

Regionally, the positive trends have been strongest in Quebec and Ontario, and within those provinces, in Montreal and Toronto. The picture is somewhat less sanguine on the West Coast with levels policy support virtually the same now as in early 1996 in Vancouver and, if anything, slightly below that level in the remainder of British Columbia (excluding Victoria). In Vancouver, this assessment must be qualified by saying that there was a marked drop in levels policy support in the latter half of 1996 but subsequent surveys have shown a fairly steady growth in support, with the most recent surveys showing the same levels policy support as before the drop. However, it should be noted that analyses of the most recent surveys suggest the recovery in levels policy support in Vancouver has occurred primarily within that city's immigrant population.

To what extent have these most recent trends altered the patterns that we have observed in the preceding analyses which looked at the combined results of surveys over the past three years? In general, comparing the results combining the most recent pair of surveys to the results when those data are combined with data from earlier surveys, we see that the numbers are somewhat more favourable to immigration but the basic pattern of regional differences remains pretty much

the same. This would suggest that the analyses combining three years of data have not been painting a picture of the regional patterns that is distorted and out-of-date because of the inclusion of the earlier surveys.

Summary

Comparing the combined data from the seven major immigrant-receiving regions to "other" regions in these analyses, in terms of the six-region geography used in the first set of analyses, is almost the same as if we had compared the combined data for British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta to the combined data for Quebec, the Manitoba-Saskatchewan region and the Atlantic region in that earlier analysis. Hence, we already knew that this analysis would show that, despite having populations that are younger and better-educated, and having greater proportions of respondents who themselves are immigrants -- characteristics which would be expected to produce relatively greater levels policy support -- levels policy support is weaker in the regions where the immigration flow is more concentrated. However, in this second set of analyses, there is little evidence of parallel differences in the favourability of perceptions of the effects of immigration on employment, culture or the community which might explain the differences in levels policy support. Though, in the specific case of Vancouver, perceptions of effects on the community are less favourable than elsewhere, there is no evidence of a difference on this measure between the "other" regions and the combined result for the seven major immigrant-receiving regions, and those regions show greater favourability in their perceptions of economic and cultural effects.

Looking at the immigrant-receiving regions individually, Montreal tends to have the most favourable attitudes, followed by Alberta. The least favourable climates are found in Vancouver, the rest of British Columbia (excluding Victoria), and Ontario outside of Toronto. While attitudes in Toronto are somewhat more favourable toward immigration than in the remainder of Ontario, those differences tend to disappear when foreign-born respondents are excluded from the analysis.

Overall, though consistently more positive, the regional patterns among foreign-born respondents tend to resemble those for Canadian-born respondents, with the most favourable attitudes tending to be found in the regions where relatively few new immigrants settle.

The regional patterns in levels policy support are reflected to some extent on measures related to the desired size of the population, and to concerns regarding fulfilment of sponsorship obligations, refugee determination and criminality. This last issue seems particularly salient in Vancouver, certainly reinforced by recent media stories but also evident in surveys pre-dating that unfavourable press coverage.

The overall trend in levels policy support is a favourable one over the last three years. The analysis suggests this has been driven largely by a lessening of fears that immigration will hurt employment opportunities as the unemployment rate has continued to decline, though the most recent surge in levels policy support may relate more to improvements in perceptions of the effects of immigration on culture and the community. However, these changes do not appear to have altered the overall pattern of regional differences.

The results suggest some ways that the regional differences in contextual factors discussed earlier result in regional differences in attitudes and perceptions. We see evidence that decreasing unemployment in Ontario, Quebec and Alberta is leading to more positive perceptions of employment effects and to increases in levels policy support in those regions. We see relative weaknesses in levels policy support in urban Ontario outside Toronto and the more rural areas of that province and of British Columbia that coincide with the greater age of those sub-populations and, in the latter two cases, with lower average levels of education.

And, overall, we see distinct differences between the major immigrant-receiving regions and those to which relatively few current immigrants go, differences that become more strongly evident when the analysis removes the masking influence of the greater immigrant presence in the former communities. When we look at the immigrant and Canadian-born populations separately, we see

a clear influence of the uneven regional distribution of the immigration flow on attitudes and perceptions in both. Weaker levels policy support is found in regions where the flow is concentrated, a relative weakness that cannot be accounted for by perceptions of effects in the areas of employment or culture and runs contrary to the pattern that educational and age differences would predict.

The results on other measures suggest that, while this may to some extent reflect different perceptions regarding the current rate of immigration, estimates of the actual numbers play a limited role in determining levels policy preferences and that regional differences in factors such as beliefs about the desirability of population growth and concerns regarding issues such as refugee determination, fulfilment of sponsorship obligations and immigrant criminality are more important. This, of course, fits well with the fact that there is much greater media coverage of any problems associated with these program areas in the regions where more current immigrants settle.

These analyses suggest the uneven distribution of the immigration flow has produced differential levels policy effects on several aspects of public opinion related to immigration. And, nowhere is this more the case than in Vancouver where the rapid rate of social change due to recent immigration appears to have had marked effects on attitudes and perceptions. Levels policy support continues to be relatively weak in that city and its residents continue to be among the most likely in the country to report that immigration has had a negative effect on their community. However, recent surveys do show a significant trend toward increasing levels policy support among Vancouver residents.

So, these analyses suggest that the inverse relation between regional immigration flow rates and levels policy support is not explicable by similar patterns in perceptions of effects of immigration on employment opportunities or culture but a parallel relation between flow and concerns in other areas is observed. But what does an analysis using this geography show regarding the attitude toward immigrants?

Trends in acceptance of non-white immigrants

While the overall national trend is toward significantly greater acceptance of "non-white" immigration over the ten-year period, inspection of the results in Table 15 suggests both that levels of acceptance vary across the seven major immigrant-receiving regions and that the trends over time also are not uniform.

As we might expect, given the overall positive relation with flow shown in the earlier six-region analyses of this question, the analysis of the measure of acceptance of "non-white" immigration looking at the major immigrant-receiving regions separately shows a tendency for acceptance to be greater in those regions than in the regions grouped together under the "other" category.

The results of regional analyses (reported in 1998), examining the Environics surveys between 1989 and 1996, showed Toronto residents to have lower levels of acceptance of "non-white" immigration than any of the other regions in the analysis, though, as in all regions, levels of acceptance were high. The results of the same analyses also revealed that, while Vancouver residents showed greater acceptance of "non-white" immigrants than did residents of any other region, there was a trend for Vancouver residents to show less such acceptance in the more recent surveys than in the earlier ones, the opposite of the general trend elsewhere.

The October 1998 Environics survey shows a marked change in Toronto since 1996 in the direction of greater acceptance of "non-white" immigration, with the results for that city now virtually the same as the average for the country as a whole. The results for Vancouver are somewhat less encouraging, showing a continuation of the trend toward less acceptance found in the earlier analyses, with acceptance in that city now barely exceeding the national average.

Among the more plausible explanations for these results would be, first, that the sharp improvement in Toronto may to some extent reflect an increased public wariness of appearing racist in responses to this survey question as a result of the extensive publicity received by the earlier report. Second, in Vancouver, the continuation of the trend toward less tolerant responses suggests that residents of that city are still showing the effects of the rapid rate of

Table 15. Acceptance of "non-white" immigrants, by region and year (Environics surveys).

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	all	(n)
toronto	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.4	4.1	4.5	4.2	(1880)
vancouver	4.4	4.7	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.6	(872)
combined	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.5	4.3	(2752)
montreal	4.2	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.4	(1488)
alta urban	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.5	(755)
ont urban	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.5	(1211)
ont rural	4.1	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.4	(2186)
b c rural	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.6	4.5	(701)
combined	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.4	(6340)
major 7	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.4	(9093)
other	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	(5086)
canada	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	(14179)

f-values:

	8 regions	3 regions	major 7, other	tor & van, major 5	major 5, other
region	19.38***	16.87***	13.42***	20.45***	26.30***
year	24.76***	25.03***	25.23***	20.39***	20.18***
interaction	2.11***	1.90*	1.27	2.56*	1.18

social change they experienced during the middle part of this decade, coupled with economic stagnation in that region. Both these explanations are, however, speculative. Future surveys will need to be examined to determine whether, in fact, the increased acceptance in Toronto is maintained and whether the lessening of acceptance in Vancouver continues.

Another factor that needs to be considered when interpreting the results of questions such as these regards the possible effects of the ethnicity of the interviewer on the answers given by respondents and how differences, between regions within a survey or between surveys within a region, in the ethnic make-up of the interviewers may lead to or mask differences in responses. We will now present the results of some analyses speaking to this question.

Interviewer effects

Among the factors that may influence how an individual responds to a question in a survey are the characteristics of the person asking the question. If the respondent perceives a relation between the content of the question and one or more characteristics of the interviewer, this can lead to an assumption that the interviewer will have a personal reaction to the respondent's answer. That assumption may affect the answer, usually inhibiting responses that are perceived likely to elicit negative reactions by the interviewer and promoting answers perceived likely to produce positive ones.

Numerous studies have shown that research participants will try to give the responses that they think will please the researchers by confirming their hypotheses. Other studies have shown that respondents may be less likely to give answers expressing negative attitudes toward a certain social group (e.g., African-americans) when they are interviewed by a member of that group, than when interviewed by someone not belonging to that group.

Thus, when we are looking at survey results for questions related to immigration, any cue that may suggest to the respondent that the interviewer is himself or herself a member of the immigrant community can potentially affect the results. For example, in telephone surveys, the presence of a foreign-born

accent has sometimes been found to predispose respondents to give answers more favourable to immigrants or immigration. And, in face-to-face interviews, such as used by the Environics organization in the October 1998 survey, visual cues such as skin pigmentation or dress would, along with accent, be expected to have effects on responses.

To examine this issue, Environics was asked to provide information on the interviewer's birthplace for each interview conducted. While the vast majority if interviews were conducted by persons born in Canada, as might be expected, significant numbers of interviews in Toronto and Vancouver were conducted by persons born outside of Canada, enabling an examination of interviewer birthplace effects in those two cities. In Toronto, of 172 interviews, the interviewer birthplace was Italy for 20 and the West Indies for 12. In Vancouver, of 305 interviews, the interviewer birthplace was India for 63 and Vietnam for 30.

Interviewer effects in Toronto

Of the fourteen questions related to immigration (listed in Appendix B), only three showed significant effects of interviewer birthplace in the Toronto sample (see Table 16).

On the Environics question "Overall there is too much immigration to Canada", respondents were more likely to agree with the anti-immigration statement when the interviewer was born in Italy and less likely to agree with it when the interviewer was born in the West Indies, compared to when interviewers were born in Canada.

With respect to "keeping criminals out of the country", Toronto respondents, on average, agreed the government was doing a good job of this when the interviewer was born in Italy but expressed the opposite view when interviewers were born in Canada or in the West Indies.

With respect to "non-white" immigrants, disagreement with the idea of barring "non-whites" from immigrating to Canada was not as strong when interviewers were born in Canada as when they were born in Italy or, especially, the West Indies.

Table 16. Results by interviewer birthplace -- Toronto (Environics October 1998).

	canada	italy	w. i.	all	f 1-3	f 2,3	f 1,2&3
number of immigrants	3.1	2.8	3.5	3.1	.84	2.31	.19
effect on employment	2.5	2.1	2.5	2.5	1.22	1.25	3.74t
effect on culture	3.3	3.6	3.7	3.4	1.08	.00	1.25
effect on community	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.3	.23	.08	1.37
too much immigration	2.8	2.2	3.5	2.8	3.34*	8.28**	.58
many are not refugees	2.2	1.8	1.8	2.1	1.37	.02	4.91*
don't allow non-whites	4.4	4.8	5.0	4.5	3.84*	1.985	6.25**
criminals are kept out	2.1	3.6	2.1	2.3	12.19***	11.03**	18.11***
imms. take jobs away	3.4	3.4	4.2	3.4	1.78	2.87t	.83
don't adopt Can. values	2.4	2.2	3.1	2.4	1.61	5.10*	.03
allow political refugees	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.1	.44	.78	.00
good ref. determination	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.4	.84	.08	.51
positive economic impact	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.5	.36	.00	1.31
accept more refugees	2.7	3.3	3.0	2.8	2.09	.72	1.78
(sample size)	(133)	(20)	(12)	(165)			

Interviewer effects in Vancouver

In contrast to the Toronto results, interviewer birthplace effects were found on ten of the fourteen immigration-related questions in the Vancouver sample (see Table 17).

On nine of the ten questions showing such effects, respondents interviewed by interviewers born in India or Vietnam gave responses more favourable to immigrants or immigration than the responses of those speaking to Canadian-born interviewers. These included the four CIC tracking questions measuring levels policy support and the perceived effects of immigration on employment opportunities, culture and the community, as well as the Environics questions regarding whether there is too much immigration, whether immigrants take jobs away from other Canadians, whether there are many immigrants who do not adopt Canadian values, whether Canada is doing a good job deciding refugee claims and whether immigration has a positive impact on the economy.

There were, however, also differences on some questions between responses to interviewers born in India and responses to interviewers born in Vietnam. On the questions regarding the effect of immigration on employment opportunities, whether immigrants take jobs away, whether there is too much immigration and whether "non-whites" should be allowed to immigrate to Canada, responses to interviewers born in India were more favourable to immigrants and immigration than were responses to interviewers born in Vietnam (as well as than responses to interviewers born in Canada). In contrast, on the questions regarding whether immigrants adopt Canadian values and whether Canada does a good job of refugee determination, the responses to interviewers born in Vietnam were more favourable to immigrants than were the responses to interviewers born in India.

Association between birthplaces

While at first glance the results suggest interviewer birthplace has very strong effects on responses among Vancouver residents but not among Toronto residents, further analysis suggests there is a marked difference between the two cities in how the survey interviews were conducted.

Table 17. Results by interviewer birthplace -- Vancouver (Environics October 1998).

	canada	india	vietnam	all	f 1-3	f 2,3	f 1,2&3
number of immigrants	2.5	3.5	3.5	2.8	12.50***	.00	25.61***
effect on employment	2.4	3.1	2.6	2.6	8.29***	3.91*	12.21***
effect on culture	3.2	3.6	3.7	3.3	5.03**	.12	10.28***
effect on community	2.9	3.7	3.4	3.1	10.51***	1.09	20.61***
too much immigration	2.5	3.4	2.5	2.7	9.85***	8.39**	12.71***
many are not refugees	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.1	2.07	2.55	1.50
don't allow non-whites	4.6	4.8	4.2	4.6	5.70**	17.74***	.22
criminals are kept out	1.8	1.9	2.3	1.9	2.20	2.53	1.89
imms. take jobs away	3.0	3.8	3.2	3.2	9.21***	5.17*	14.56***
don't adopt Can. values	2.2	2.5	3.1	2.4	6.63**	4.55*	8.94**
allow political refugees	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.3	.78	.17	1.52
good ref. determination	2.0	2.5	3.4	2.2	18.97***	9.97**	25.39***
positive economic impact	3.4	4.0	3.7	3.6	6.58**	1.79	12.11***
accept more refugees	2.9	2.9	2.6	2.9	.86	1.28	.50
(sample size)	(211)	(63)	(30)	(304)			

In Vancouver, there is virtually no difference between Canadian-born and foreign-born interviewers regarding what proportion of the interviews they conduct are with respondents born in Canada versus respondents born outside the country -- in both cases, approximately six out of ten interviews are with Canadian-born respondents and four out of ten with foreign-born respondents (see Table A-14 in the Appendix). In Toronto, however, interviewers who were born outside of Canada conduct the majority (64%) of their interviews with respondents who were also born outside the country, while Canadian-born interviewers mainly interview Canadian-born respondents (79%).

These systematic associations of immigrant interviewers with immigrant respondents and of non-immigrant interviewers with non-immigrant respondents, in the Toronto sample, vastly reduce the number of cases in which Canadian-born respondents are being asked the questions by a member of the immigrant community. Since the type of birthplace effect we are looking at here -- more favourable responses to immigration when the interviewer is an immigrant -- may well be more marked when respondents are Canadian-born, this could reduce the sensitivity of these analyses in Toronto. Moreover, Vancouver was over-sampled in this survey, providing a larger overall sample, and a correspondingly larger sub-sample of interviews conducted by interviewers born outside Canada, there than in Toronto.

These two factors combined may be responsible for the different patterns of results in the two cities. When we find interviewer birthplace effects on almost all immigration-related questions among Vancouver residents but only a few similar effects among Toronto residents, these differing patterns may largely or entirely be due to the fact that the analysis is far less powerful in Toronto. It may be that if we had equally sensitive tests of interviewer birthplace effects in Toronto, we would find them to be as prevalent and as strong there as in Vancouver. The fact that a much less sensitive analysis still finds some effects in Toronto increases our expectation that this would be the case.

Types of interviewer effects

The birthplace of the interviewer can operate to influence the survey results in more than one way.

First, respondents may be inhibited by the interviewer's apparent birthplace or ethnicity from responding to questions in a manner that the respondents believe may be offensive to the interviewer. Second, interviewer birthplace or ethnicity may affect decisions of the people requested to participate in the survey as to whether or not to comply with that request -- that is, persons who are relatively prejudiced or have negative attitudes toward immigration may be less likely to agree to be interviewed when called or visited by an immigrant interviewer than when the interviewer is a non-immigrant.

Both types of interviewer birthplace effect would lead to responses being more favourable to immigration when the data were collected by interviewers born outside of Canada -- in one case, because respondents were hiding their true feelings to avoid giving offence and, in the other case, because respondents with less favourable views of immigration would be less likely to agree to be interviewed by an immigrant. So, observing interviewer effects in a survey may mean that respondents are changing their answers or it may mean that different interviewers are sampling from different populations. And, the implications of the two types of effects may differ as well, with one case representing a display of consideration for the feelings of immigrants while the other may represent feelings of hostility toward immigrants. However, without further data, simply observing the presence of an interviewer effect does not enable us to specify which of these possibilities is the case.

Interviewer assignment

A further complication in interpreting the interviewer birthplace effects, in the Environics survey, relates to that organization's practice of assigning interviewers to collect data from neighbourhoods near their place of residence. While understandable from the perspective of minimizing travel costs and time, this non-random method of assignment increases the potential for pre-existing

acquaintance between interviewers and respondents which may affect responses. Further, in regions where residential segregation exists between immigrant and non-immigrant communities, which is fairly common, this practice may result in foreign-born interviewers being more likely to be knocking on the doors of potential respondents born outside of Canada and less likely to be attempting to interview respondents born in Canada, in comparison to Canadian-born interviewers working from the same regional office.

This non-random element of the Environics method of data collection for their face-to-face surveys severely reduces the usefulness of the results. For example, where we see a systematic tendency for foreign-born interviewers to be more likely to interview foreign-born respondents, compared to Canadian-born interviewers, in Toronto but not in Vancouver, we have no way of knowing whether this represents a greater tendency of Canadian-born respondents in Toronto to refuse to be interviewed by foreign-born interviewers or a tendency of the foreign-born interviewers in Toronto to be assigned to neighbourhoods with greater proportions of foreign-born residents, compared to the neighbourhoods assigned to foreign-born interviewers in Vancouver. Similarly, when we see residents of either city giving responses more favourable to immigrants and immigration to foreign-born interviewers than to Canadian-born interviewers, we cannot be sure whether those responses are being biased by a reaction to the interviewer's birthplace or are more favourable because the people being interviewed by the foreign-born interviewers are those who choose to live in neighbourhoods with relatively high percentages of immigrant residents because they have fewer prejudices than those who choose to live elsewhere.

We know from other research where interviewers are randomly assigned, that interviewer birthplace effects occur and, when the assignment is random, we can measure their magnitude and adjust results accordingly. If assignment is random, we can also compare refusal rates for different interviewers and see where they differ as a function of interviewer ethnicity. These things cannot be done in the Environics survey because of the non-random assignment. If we, for example, remove the data collected by foreign-born interviewers and compare two regions,

their respective samples will no longer be representative because of the systematic assignment of interviewers to neighbourhoods. Similarly, if we compare the refusal rates for foreign-born interviewers assigned to neighbourhoods near where they live and Canadian-born interviewers assigned to neighbourhoods near where they live, we have no way of knowing whether the refusal rates are different because of the birthplaces of the interviewers or because of differences between the neighbourhoods, whereas if assignment to neighbourhoods were random, any differences could be attributed to birthplace effects.

Since we know interviewer birthplace affects responses to questions related to immigration and ethnic differences, the results of surveys of such issues are less reliable unless the analysis controls for such effects. This is relatively easily done in any survey where respondents are randomly assigned to interviewers but impossible where interviewer assignment is non-random. Hence, unless Environics changes its practice to one of randomly assigning interviewers to neighbourhoods, the meaningfulness of the results of any questions with content related to issues like immigration and ethnic or cultural diversity placed in their in-person surveys will be severely compromised.

The implication with respect to the present analyses, for example, is that while we see what look like the strong interviewer birthplace effects that we would expect in a face-to-face survey and that is our best guess interpretation (especially given the differences that were observed between responses to interviewers born outside of Canada but in different countries), we must admit the possibility that no such effects occurred or were much weaker than they appear and that the differences were to some extent or entirely the result of foreign-born interviewers covering different neighbourhoods than did Canadian-born interviewers -- that is, the results are probably biased by interviewer effects in the direction favourable to immigrants and immigration but we cannot be sure. Had the organization not violated the primary research rule of independent random sampling, we would know. Results regarding changes over time are less subject to such qualification as interviewer effects would be expected

to show less systematic variation across surveys but, again, this is a best guess as opposed to the knowledge that following sound scientific practices would yield.

Which surveys to believe?

We mentioned earlier that, other considerations aside, the placement of the "too much immigration" question relatively late in the Environics interviews makes it more susceptible, than the "too few, too many" question, to distortions due to the effects of preceding questions and, hence, less reliable as an indicator of levels policy support. Added to this, we would expect face-to-face interviews to produce stronger interviewer effects than would telephone surveys and the results presented in the preceding pages, while not conclusive, would certainly fit with this.

Moreover, differences between the organization's sampling frames (e.g., Environics regularly over-samples the Atlantic region and under-samples Ontario) as well as different question wording might also contribute to differing patterns of results. With respect to sampling frames, it should be noted that the "too few, too many" surveys were conducted by organizations other than Angus Reid between 1992 and 1995 and the inverse relation was equally evident in those years as in the more recent surveys conducted by Angus Reid.

There are also likely to be differences between the sub-population willing to participate in telephone surveys and the sub-population willing to invite representatives of a survey organization into their homes. Related to this sampling issue is the fact that the Environics samples consistently have lower average levels of education and greater average ages, than the samples in the telephone surveys.

Taking all these factors into consideration, it is not surprising that we should sometimes find different results in one set of surveys than we do in the other. Where this does not happen, when results are similar, the fortunate consequence is simply an increased confidence in our conclusions. However, when the results are dissimilar, we need to decide which to believe and, in the

analyses presented in this report, considering the various factors we have discussed, it would seem logical to give greater confidence to the results obtained from the telephone surveys than to those obtained from the face-to-face interviews by Environics.

As well, because we have a much larger volume of survey data covering the more recent years than we have for the earlier time period covered by our analyses, we are accordingly much more confident in the accuracy of the results of analyses pertaining to the recent time period. So, when we find stronger evidence of an inverse relation between the regional rate of flow and levels policy support in more recent years than in the 1980s, we must be open to the possibility that such a phenomenon was equally strong during the earlier period but our analyses did not pick it up because of the relative scarcity of data from that time.

Arguing against that possibility is the fact that we find statistically significant evidence of the inverse relation in numerous single surveys during the recent period and, when we are analyzing just one of the recent surveys, that analysis is no more powerful than the analysis of a single survey from the earlier time period. And, in few of those earlier surveys is such an inverse relation evident. However, we must also consider the fact that the inverse relation between levels policy support and the regional immigration flow is much more strongly evident in surveys asking the "too few, too many" question than in the Environics surveys, even when we restrict the analysis to Environics surveys from 1988 to 1998. As mentioned earlier, there are numerous plausible explanations for this but, regardless of which may be the cause, if Environics surveys are less likely to show evidence of the inverse relation, then the fact that we have little evidence of it during a time period for which all our data is from Environics surveys does little to convince us that the inverse relation did not exist at that time.

Gallup surveys

Further evidence regarding this issue is found in an analysis of telephone surveys conducted by the Gallup organization over that earlier time period. Those surveys asked: "If it were your job to plan an immigration policy for Canada at this time, would you be inclined to increase immigration, decrease immigration or keep the number of immigrants at about the current level?" in 1975, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988 and 1989. Sample sizes were slightly over 1000 for each survey.

The results, shown in Table 18 (and Table A-15 in the Appendix), clearly suggest that an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support existed in 1975 and in the early 1980s but not toward the end of the decade, despite any regional differences in other factors influencing levels policy preferences. While it remained weak in British Columbia, levels policy support in Ontario, the region with the highest flow rate in the late 1980s, grew relative to other regions as the Ontario economy boomed.

So, taking the Gallup results into consideration leaves us concluding that an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support was present in 1975 and the early 1980s, was absent during the economic boom in the late 1980s, and reappeared in the early 1990s when the economy went into recession. To the point of the most recent survey available at the time of writing, it appears to be persisting despite the recovery in the employment figures: Analyses of January and March 1999 Angus Reid surveys continue to show a tendency for levels policy support to be greater in regions with relatively low flow rates, despite recent unemployment figures that approach, and in some regions are below, those observed during the best years employment-wise of the 1980s.

The implication is that the regional per capita flow rates of greater than 1% in British Columbia and Ontario in recent years are sufficiently high that their negative impact on levels policy support has not been counteracted by the positive impact of the improving employment figures. Our other analyses support this interpretation where they suggest that the relative lack in levels policy support in the major immigrant-receiving regions is fuelled by concerns about

Table 18. Levels policy support by region in Gallup surveys from 1975 to 1989, annual means and relations with regional rate of flow -- "plan immigration" question.

	1975	1980	1982	1985	1987	1988	1989	all	(n)
br. columbia	-.31	-.28	-.34	-.18	-.11	-.17	-.19	-.23	(816)
ontario	-.17	-.12	-.07	-.07	.07	.13	.13	-.02	(2581)
alberta	.00	.13	-.28	-.14	-.19	.02	-.02	-.06	(642)
quebec	.19	.21	.21	.29	.08	.10	.01	.16	(1985)
man & sask	.24	.08	.03	-.07	-.13	-.25	-.13	-.02	(602)
atlantic	.20	-.04	.26	-.22	-.06	-.39	-.14	-.05	(658)
correlation	-.19***	-.10***	-.18***	-.07*	.04	.10***	.08*	-.02	
beta value	-.21***	-.22***	-.17***	-.13**	-.04	-.05	-.02	-.10***	
raw mean	1.71	1.68	1.52	1.71	1.71	1.74	1.81	1.69	
(n)	(1067)	(1062)	(1066)	(1028)	(1013)	(1035)	(1013)		(7284)

issues other than employment fears. That is, perceptions of the effects of immigration on employment opportunities are at least as favourable in the major immigrant-receiving regions as elsewhere, but residents of those regions appear to have greater concerns than the residents of other regions regarding issues like refugee determination, immigrant criminality and the effects of immigration on the community.

It remains to be seen whether this pattern of results will persist in future surveys. As was noted in the introductory pages of this report, the recovery from the most recent recession's job losses has been more prolonged than was the case for the recession during the early 1980s. It is possible that continuing improvement or stability in economic conditions will lead to a disappearance of the inverse relation between flow and levels policy support. It may be that its persistence is a reflection of a persisting economic insecurity resulting from the greater duration of the effects of the most recent recession.

However, the results in the earliest Gallup surveys, where the inverse relation was present despite a national unemployment rate of under 8%, would argue that it may persist. If we leave aside the Environics surveys for the moment and just look at the results for the Gallup and the "too few, too many" surveys, the inverse relation is present in all years except for a period of a few years beginning in 1987. The increase in levels policy support in Ontario which led to the disappearance of the inverse relation followed a number of years in which the level of unemployment had been declining steadily and immigration had been at a relatively low level. While unemployment has been declining fairly steadily in recent years, the level of immigration has been much greater than in the early and mid-1980s. Thus, unless both the current decline in the rate of immigration continues and unemployment remains at or falls below its current level, achieving a closer replication of the context in the late 1980s, levels policy support may continue to remain weaker in the immigrant-receiving regions than in other parts of the country.

Effects of geography used

Among the many questions which the analyses presented here do not address, one of the most germane is whether we are discussing how attitudes relate to the flow of new immigrants or the presence of earlier immigrants. Looking at the figures presented in Table 4, the two are obviously very highly correlated. An analysis employing census data on birthplace and period of residence, along with a much finer geography, might be able to reduce that correlation somewhat in that, in some areas, the immigrant community would be composed to a greater extent of representatives of earlier waves of immigration, compared to other areas where more recently arrived immigrants would be in the majority.

Note that in such an analysis, either the flow variable or the variable representing the most recent wave of immigrants (the shortest period of residence) would have to be dropped from the analysis because the two would be almost perfectly correlated. This fact underlines the porousness of the conceptual boundary between flow and presence. When we talk of flow effects, we are actually referring to the effects of the presence in the community of recent arrivals who are in the early stages of the integration process -- after all, it is not the act of disembarking from the plane that will be the source of such effects.

The conceptual waters are further muddied by the fact that integration is a continuous process that may last for a number of years, raising the question of what time period should be used in the analysis. The use in the present analyses, of the previous year's landings was predicated on the assumption that effects would be strongest during the initial phase of the integration process but that some minimum time period would be required for existing residents to experience any changes to their environment resulting from arrivals. However, it may be that a more appropriate choice would have been to lag landings by two or three years, or only by three, six or nine months, or to use the average of the previous two years or the previous three years, or to use different criteria depending on region of origin, gender, age and education of the newcomers and also changing those criteria as a function of the characteristics of the

particular groups of existing residents whose attitudes were being examined. After all, neither newcomers nor existing residents are homogenous groups that undergo identical experiences of the integration process and perceptions thereof, respectively.

To capture all the effects of arrivals on public attitudes would require much more sophisticated analyses than those performed here, which certainly only represent an initial step in that direction. How far down that road we can proceed remains to be seen but will obviously be dependent on the quality of the available data.

It is important to remember a few things related to the use of the previous year's landings in the present analyses. In no way does this imply that flow effects occur only in the first year -- since settlement patterns do not change rapidly, the pattern of results would probably change very little if we had used the current year's figures or landings from two years earlier. As well, we should not think of the effects of levels policy decisions as being confined to any limited time period -- the fact that we are looking at short-term effects should not lead to any impression that they are necessarily stronger or more important than any longer-term effects.

We alluded above to an analysis that might use a finer geography to try to statistically separate the effects on public attitudes of more recent arrivals from those of the presence of members of earlier waves of immigration. A factor to be considered in that respect is how the choice of geography affects what types of effects the analysis is examining. The present analysis, because of the use of intended destination statistics, was obligated to employ fairly broad regional categories because only in the most recent years are such figures available down to the CMA level. With census data on period of residence, a much finer geography would become feasible.

However, employing a very fine level of geography may well have the effect of desensitizing the analysis to the type of effects it seeks to measure. For example, assume the key factor mediating the relation between flow and attitudes is whether or not new arrivals represent potential job competitors for self or

family members. If so, then the geography of choice is one with units that correspond to the regional labour market. If the analysis were to employ a geography broken down to, say, the neighbourhood level, then it would treat respondents living in the same city but different neighbourhoods from newcomers, as if they were not competing in the same labour market. Such possibilities may mean that a broader geography may provide the more powerful analysis. Moreover, it is certainly possible, if not probable, that different types of effects will operate on different geographical levels -- for example, the above postulated "job competitor effect" might operate to promote a negative relation between flow and attitudes at the regional level at the same time that a "neighbourhood contact effect" was promoting a relation in the opposite direction at that finer geographical level.

Such possibilities need to be explored in future analyses. With respect to the present analyses, the implication is that they are by no means necessarily weakened or made more prone to error in this respect because of the relatively broad categories used. Rather, we must simply be conscious of the fact that analyses using a relatively broad geography will be maximally sensitive to effects which operate on a correspondingly broad regional level and will be relatively insensitive to any effects which operate on levels corresponding to a finer geography. To this we must add a caveat to the effect that the use of broader regional categories probably renders the analysis more vulnerable to misattributions of effects due to correlations between regional characteristics.

However, it should also be noted that, in a sense, effects observed in analyses using a relatively gross geography subsume effects that may occur at finer geographical levels. That is, the present results showing an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support, when fairly broad regional categories are used, mean that, if there are more proximal effects in the opposite direction that might be detected by analyses employing a finer geography, those opposite effects would have to be weaker than the more distal effects detected by the broader analysis. Alternatively, the results of the broader analysis might be produced by proximal effects that are strong enough to

be detected despite employing a geography that is less than maximally sensitive to them and stronger than any opposite more distal effects. In other words, while we cannot be sure at what geographical level the observed effects operate, we can be confident they are more powerful than any effects in the opposite direction operating at the same or any level below that corresponding to our analysis.

As an example, consider the effects of regional media coverage compared to the effects of interactions with new immigrants living in the neighbourhood. The geography used in the present analyses is obviously much closer to the level at which regional media coverage operates than to that of the neighbourhood. We find an inverse relation between levels policy support and flow rates. Because our analysis is much more sensitive to regional effects than to neighbourhood effects, it is more probable that the relation we observe represents a regional effect but it is still possible that the effects are at the neighbourhood level but strong enough that we can pick them up with an analysis at the regional level: It is more likely that we are looking at the effects of media coverage than the effects of neighbourhood interactions but we cannot be sure. But the fact that the inverse relation between flow and levels policy support exists at the regional level can only be explained by (a) both media and neighbourhood contact effects being negative and reinforcing each other, (b) neighbourhood effects being positive but too weak to counteract negative media effects, or (c) media effects being positive but too weak to counteract negative neighbourhood effects. If (d) neighbourhood effects were positive and stronger than negative media effects, (e) media effects were positive and stronger than negative neighbourhood effects, or (f) both neighbourhood and media effects were positive, we would not get the inverse relation at the regional level.

Hence, while analyses at a finer geography would provide information enabling specification of the level or levels at which factors were operating to produce the inverse relation -- whether (a), (b) or (c) were true in our example -- without performing such analyses, we know we would not find that the overall impact of flow on policy support is positive -- (d), (e) and (f) would not be

possible results. In other words, while employing a finer geography would provide more information about the relation between flow and levels policy support, there is no danger it would disprove the conclusion of an overall inverse relation.

Immigrant classes

Not addressed by the present analyses is the question of the role played by the differing classes of immigrants. This may be an important variable to be examined by future investigations of the relation between flow and levels policy support. If, as we surmise, there are limits to the flow that can be accommodated without a negative effect on policy support and those limits move up and down as a function of economic conditions, then to some extent this problem will be self-correcting. That is, as economic conditions worsen, a given region will become less attractive as a destination for migrants. Thus, all other factors being equal, flow would decrease. However, all other factors are far from equal.

First, one needs to consider the fact that the comparisons made by migrants at the national level are between Canada, other countries, and the country of origin, not between Canada this year and Canada two years ago. While at first glance this might seem to be a factor that would impede self-correcting tendencies at the national but not at the regional level, this may not really be the case -- if one is coming from a country with a fifty per cent unemployment rate, the difference between an 8% rate in one region and a 10% rate in another may well seem negligible.

The second factor that might be expected to interfere with a tendency for a deteriorating employment situation to result in a reduction of the flow below the rate that would damage levels policy support would be the extent to which the pull factors are non-economic. Important here would be the proportions of the flow composed of both family class and refugee immigrants. The greater the proportion of the flow composed of those two classes, the less one would expect the flow to decrease in response to increased unemployment rates. As well,

members of those classes are probably more likely than independent immigrants to become the subject of media reports on issues like immigrant use of social assistance.

Levels during recessions

The results suggest the negative influence of high flow rates on levels policy support is mediated by press coverage of various problems associated with the immigration program. As well as the tendency of the media to focus on "bad" rather than "good" news and the public's inclination to look for factors that may be the source of problems and, hence, to scapegoat social groups such as immigrants when social and/or economic problems exist, the continued increased levels of immigration through the 1990s recession may well have contributed to such negative media coverage in at least two ways.

First, because levels were higher during the recession than they had been during the boom in the late 1980s, this would create a correlation between higher levels and higher unemployment in the minds of lay and other analysts, increasing the likelihood of blaming immigration for increased unemployment, regardless of whether of not a true causal relation existed.

Second, an increased immigration flow during an economic downturn would, in fact, be predicted to increase problems in at least some areas, if not overall. While the stimulative effect of the increased demand produced by new immigrants, coupled with their possible adding to the quality of the labour force and increasing the availability of investment capital might more than compensate for it in overall terms, it will be much harder for new immigrants to find jobs when unemployment is at 11%, compared to when it is at 7 or 8%. This would increase the period of time required for successful integration and the incidence of newcomers having to rely on social assistance or criminal activities in order to support themselves, in turn producing greater numbers of real problem cases to be reported by the media or transmitted by word-of-mouth.

Hence, while, possibly, being beneficial to the economy as a whole, high levels of immigration during recessionary times, as well as probably having at

least a short-term deleterious effect on employment opportunities (if nothing else, the addition to the labour force should be disruptive), would result in increasing the difficulty of the adaptation process for new immigrants and the severity of the problems they experience. In turn, those more severe problems would provide more grist for the media mill and one might expect correspondingly greater negative effects on public attitudes.

An inevitable finding?

What is really "news" when we think about the results presented here? In a way, it is inconceivable that there would not be some kind of inverse relation between immigration flow and levels policy support under some conditions. After all, if policy-makers set the level of immigration at zero, no-one could say there were too many immigrants coming and, were the level to be set at an unthinkable level in the millions, everyone would say there was too much immigration.

So, the actual research question to which our analyses speak is not whether there will be an inverse relation but, more precisely, what is the shape of that relation, what are its governing factors and, given the range of flow rates existing in Canada across regions and over time, do we see evidence of greater opposition to immigration as the rate of flow increases. For, while the inverse relation may be a certainty if one compares the extremes of zero immigration and unthinkably high levels, it is by no means certain to exist when comparing, say, flow rates of .3 and .9 new immigrants per one hundred existing residents, and factors such as economic conditions and information flow may well moderate how the rate of immigration affects policy support.

It is in this sense that the present results shed some light on how levels policy decisions may affect public attitudes. Within the range of flow rates experienced in Canada over the period from 1975 to 1997, the data show evidence of the occurrence of an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support and moderation of that relation by economic conditions.

Overall, the relatively sparse database from the 1980s suggests that, within the lower range of flow rates during that time-frame, the inverse relation existed during the negative phase of the economic cycle but not during its positive phase. In turn, this suggests a threshold flow rate for negative effects on levels policy support which is pushed upward and downward by economic conditions.

In contrast, during the 1990s, there is little evidence of the inverse relation between flow and levels policy support weakening as the economic cycle moved from its negative to its positive phase. This would suggest that flow rates during this period have been above a point where their negative impact on levels policy support could be counteracted by improvements in economic conditions. This last must be qualified by the fact that further improvement or stability in the unemployment figures may lead to a disappearance of the inverse relation, especially since the level of immigration has been declining.

Other analyses have suggested that, in recent years, the relative lack of levels policy support in the major immigrant-receiving regions has not been the result of any greater tendency for residents of those regions to be concerned about the effects of immigration on employment opportunities, compared to residents of regions with lower flow rates. Rather, the results suggest residents of regions with higher flow rates show greater perceptions of negative effects of immigration on the community and of problems in areas such as immigrant criminality and refugee determination. This might suggest that, at higher rates of flow, such perceptions become more important determinants of the levels policy preference, which would explain how the improvement in the unemployment rate has not led to a weakening of the inverse relation between flow and support in the 1990s. Unfortunately, we have no directly comparable data regarding such perceptions from surveys during the 1980s.

Our results do not enable us to specify precisely at what rate of immigration flow negative effects on levels policy support begin to occur. nor do the data permit specifying the exact degree to which the relation between flow and levels policy support is affected by changes in economic conditions. We can

only offer a general impression that, during the 1980s, when the national flow rate tended to be in the .4 to .6% per capita range, negative flow effects seemed to tend to occur in regions receiving between .5 and 1% per capita during the economic downturn but not during the positive phase of the economic cycle, whereas, in the 1990s, with national flow rates in the .7 to .9% range, what appear to be negative flow affects in British Columbia and Ontario, with their regional rates in excess of 1%, seem to be persisting through the economic recovery. From this we can offer a rough guess that a regional per capita flow rate in excess of .5% will have a negative impact on levels policy support during an economic downturn and that regional rates in excess of 1% will have such negative effects regardless of the phase of the economic cycle. However, the tentative nature of these estimates must be emphasized.

The processes involved

What does this inverse relation tell us about how flow affects the way Canadians make up their minds about the level of immigration? Well, first it suggests that there is a minimum rate of flow below which any perceptions of negative effects are seen as unimportant. That is, if there seems to be very little immigration, it is harder for individuals to see it as an important factor in the genesis of the societal issues which concern them. Hence, they would be less motivated to say the level is too high and, perhaps, more open to seeing an increase in immigration as a way of helping solve problems, such as a stagnant economy.

However, as flow increases and individuals become more conscious of immigration as having a significant impact on their social and economic environment, any perceptions of negative consequences will take on an increasing significance with respect to their potential to be sources of, or factors that will exacerbate, the problems which concern them. The result would be an increasing tendency to see levels policy as being set too high.

All of this may seem obvious but there are factors which make it less so. Human beings are not known to be perfectly rational creatures and a finding, say,

that residents of an economically depressed region blame immigration for the problem, despite a very low regional flow rate, would probably not cause much consternation in the social scientific community. Related to this is the issue of how well-informed the public is with respect to the rate of flow -- given common findings that their estimates of the actual level of immigration are not very accurate, results showing no sensitivity to differences in flow rate would not have been shocking. As well, there is the question of the role that prejudice plays in determining levels policy support. The bigot's view is that "any is too many of them" and, hence, opposition to immigration attributable to chronic prejudice would not be expected to be sensitive to rate changes, thus constituting another example of how a less than rational public might not provide survey results showing that "obvious" inverse relation between flow and levels policy support.

Here, we should underline that the results showing sensitivity to rate of flow only decrease the probability of a scenario in which all opposition to immigration is rooted in a prejudice which, having other origins, is itself unaffected by flow. In fact, the sensitivity to flow could be accounted for by changes in flow leading to changes in prejudice in turn leading to changes in levels policy support. On this crucial question, our lack of data on prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants prevents any sort of conclusive answer.

The apparent moderation by the economic cycle of the inverse relation between flow and levels policy support in the 1980s but not in the 1990s suggests two things. First, when the economy is going well, while residents in regions with relatively high flow rates will still see immigration as having a potential significant economic impact, that perception can only be reconciled with booming economic conditions by a lessening of the tendency to view that impact as negative. Second, the persistence of the inverse relation during the positive phase of the economic cycle in the 1990s suggests that the impact on levels policy support of the economic effects of immigration is limited when high rates of flow increase perceptions of problematic levels policy consequences on non-economic dimensions.

An unanswered question

Perhaps the most important gap in the present results is the lack of information with respect to the effects of immigration flow rates on attitudes toward immigrants. What data we do have, in contrast to the results regarding levels policy support, do not provide evidence of any persisting inverse relation between flow and attitudes toward immigrants but only a suggestion that such a relation occurred during the onset of the 1990s recession. However, there are several reasons not to draw any firm conclusion that the effect of flow rate on attitudes toward immigrants is different from its effect on levels policy support.

First and foremost, we do not have adequate data to enable firm conclusions. We have only the one question about "non-white" immigration, asked in only seven of the surveys, which directly attempts to measure such attitudes. Since individuals will be much less forthright in disclosing how they feel about a group of people than how they feel about a government policy, to draw firm conclusions about attitudes toward immigrants requires a much more extensive database than to draw conclusions about levels policy support. And what we have is the opposite, a much smaller database. Moreover, it comes from the Environics surveys where we suspect there are strong interviewer effects biasing results favourably toward "non-whites" in the cities receiving the greatest numbers of new immigrants.

While the "non-white" question in the Environics surveys is the only available measure of attitude toward immigrants asked in several different Canadian surveys, some further evidence on this issue is provided by an Angus Reid survey in 1991 which asked respondents how they felt about various groups of immigrants. Looking at three target groups, representing regions from which the vast majority of immigrants would be members of visible minority groups, analyses examined what proportion of respondents indicated that they would feel less comfortable with members of those groups than with members of their own ethnic group. That is, respondents, who were not members of the target group, received a score based on the difference between the level of comfort they

expressed about being with a member of their own ethnic group and the level of comfort they expressed about being with a member of the target group, while respondents who were members of the target group were excluded from the analysis. So, for example, for respondents identifying themselves as being Canadian-born and of British descent, their score would be the difference between their comfort ratings regarding being with Canadian-born individuals of British descent and their comfort rating for being with, say, a Chinese-born immigrant. This score thus provides a measure of the respondents' preference for being with members of their own ethnic group over being with members of the target groups, which is known as "ingroup favouritism".

The results (see Table 19 and Tables A-16 and A-17 in the Appendix) showed that attitudes towards the three target groups varied depending on their level of presence in the region where the respondent resided. Toward immigrants from China and from Southern Asia, attitudes were more favourable in regions where such immigrants constitute a greater proportion of the population, than were attitudes toward those groups in other regions. However, the opposite was true regarding immigrants from the Caribbean, toward whom attitudes were less favourable in regions where they comprise a greater proportion of the population, than in other regions.

So, from this 1991 survey, there is a suggestion of an inverse relation between attitudes toward one group of visible minority immigrants and the per capita rate of settlement of those immigrants in the region, but not with respect to two other such groups. This provides a partial replication of the results for the Environics "non-white" question at that time, and, further, suggests that effects of flow on attitudes toward immigrants may be selective, affecting attitudes toward a particular ethnic group adversely while those toward other groups groups of immigrants are unaffected or become more favourable. Unfortunately, more recent data with which these results could be compared is not available.

This is particularly regrettable with respect to ascertaining whether the relatively favourable attitudes toward Chinese immigrants in Vancouver have been

Table 19. Per cent displaying ingroup favouritism relative to immigrants from the caribbean, south asia and china, by region, regional per capita presence of those groups (in parentheses), and correlations between ingroup favouritism and regional presence -- 1991 Angus Reid survey.

	caribbean		south asia		china		[n]
br. columbia	39	(.06)	52	(1.10)	34	(.38)	[618]
ontario	48	(.13)	64	(.18)	39	(.21)	[1002]
alberta	45	(.08)	62	(.16)	34	(.43)	[220]
quebec	50	(.08)	71	(.02)	43	(.03)	[873]
man. & sask.	42	(.06)	66	(.08)	36	(.16)	[194]
atlantic	37	(.03)	57	(.06)	33	(.07)	[228]
canada	45	(.92)	63	(1.52)	38	(.93)	[3135]
correlation	.07***		-.12***		-.06***		

Note. Presence data from 1991 Statistics Canada census. Respondents were asked "I would like you to think of recent immigrants to Canada. These are persons born and raised outside of Canada. How comfortable would you feel being around individuals from the following groups of immigrants? ... West Indian Blacks? Chinese? Indo-Pakistanis? and Sikhs?" South Asian category combines responses to "Indo-Pakistanis" and "Sikhs". Sample sizes for "Chinese" are very slightly smaller (99%). Ingroup favouritism equals expressing greater comfort about being with member of respondent's own ethnic group than with member of target group.

affected by the dramatic increase in immigration there from that region since 1991. The analyses of the Environics data suggest a continuing trend in Vancouver toward less acceptance of "non-white" immigrants in recent surveys. As well, in Toronto, responses to this question have tended to show much less than average acceptance. Though the most recent survey shows a significant increase in acceptance of "non-white" immigrants there, that result must be qualified by the possible effects of intensive media coverage of earlier results on that question.

Also, the analyses suggesting that perceptions of non-economic effects of immigration may be adversely affected by higher flow rates are suggestive of a negative impact on the attitude toward immigrants. The prime example, here, comes again from Vancouver, with respect to the issue of criminality. Those results suggest an increased stereotyping of immigrants as being likely to be involved in crime, which would be expected, as well as affecting levels policy support, to affect attitudes and behaviour toward immigrants.

These considerations require that we await further data before saying much regarding the relation between immigration flow and the attitude toward immigrants, beyond the fact that the data suggest an inverse relation may occur during an economic downturn when flow rates are relatively high. However, because the available data do provide some suggestion that levels policy decisions may have affected levels of racism present in the major immigrant-receiving communities, the need for better data is underlined.

That result implies that greater per capita flow rates can produce increases in prejudice and that whether or not a given flow rate will have that effect depends to some extent on the state of the economy. But levels of racism will also depend on other factors, including policy decisions in areas such as communications initiatives that reduce prejudice. That is, avoiding an increase in prejudice when the economic situation deteriorates may require reducing the level of immigration but by how much or if at all will also depend on other policy decisions that affect levels of racism -- it may be possible to maintain

that extant level of immigration without any increase in prejudice if there is, say, an increase in the budget allocated to government efforts to combat racism.

If better data on attitudes toward immigrants becomes available, analyses confirming and specifying the nature of the relation between flow and those attitudes, and how that relation is moderated by economic conditions and policy decisions in other areas, will be able to inform policy-makers. Absent such data, levels policy decisions will not be well-informed with respect to their potential for increasing racism and such untoward policy consequences may occur, as the present results suggest may have been the case in 1991 and 1992, and possibly since then. Given the negative impact prejudiced attitudes have on the integration process and the well-being of members of all minority groups, obtaining better data on these attitudes is essential.

Overall summary

Recapitulating, the analyses suggest an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support existed over the entire period covered by the data, save for an interval during the later half of the 1980s when the prospering economic conditions in Ontario led to increased policy support in that region. However, there is still some evidence of the inverse relation during that interval when analyses control for regional differences in unemployment rates, education, gender and age.

The analyses of the Environics surveys show the inverse relation less clearly than do those of data collected by other organizations. We have discussed several methodological reasons why this might occur and presented data suggesting the Environics face-to-face method of data collection may make their surveys particularly susceptible to interviewer birthplace effects which would bias responses in a pro-immigration direction in regions with high flow rates. These considerations lead to giving greater confidence in the results of the analyses of data collected by other survey organizations.

There is little evidence that the inverse relation between immigration flow and levels policy support weakened during the positive phase of the economic

cycle in the late 1990s as it appeared to have done a decade earlier. This suggests the substantially greater flow rates during the more recent decade may be having negative effects on levels policy support, in the major immigrant-receiving regions, that are stronger than the countervailing effects of increased favourability of perceptions of effects of immigration on employment opportunities. This interpretation is supported by results showing that, while perceptions of the employment effects of immigration are more favourable in the major immigrant-receiving regions than in those receiving relatively low rates of flow, the reverse is true with respect to perceptions in areas such as criminality screening, refugee determination, deportation of failed claimants and fulfilment of sponsorship obligations. In other words, an inverse relation exists between regional flow rates and favourable perceptions in these areas, paralleling the relation with levels policy support, whereas the opposite relation is observed with respect to perceptions of effects on employment opportunities.

While the analyses clearly suggest an inverse relation between flow and levels policy support, moderated to some extent by economic conditions, the relative lack of data on attitudes towards immigrants makes firm conclusions in this area more difficult. There is some suggestion in the analyses of that limited database, however, that greater flow rates are associated with greater prejudice against immigrants and perhaps more so during periods of economic recession. Given the direct impact such attitudes have on the integration and well-being of newcomers, this suggestion that levels policy decisions may increase prejudice emphasizes the need for better data on such attitudes.

Table A-1. Per cent of immigration flow by province and total flow (000s), 1978-97.

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Nfld	.4	.5	.4	.4	.3	.3	.3	.4	.3	.3	.3	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.2
P E I	.2	.3	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
N S	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	.9	1.2	1.2	1.1	.8	.8	.8	.7	.6	.9	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.3
N B	.8	1.0	.8	.8	.6	.6	.7	.7	.6	.4	.4	.5	.4	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
Que	16.6	17.4	15.7	16.4	17.6	18.4	16.6	17.6	19.6	17.8	15.9	17.8	19.0	22.4	19.2	17.6	12.5	12.8	13.2	12.8
Ont	49.1	46.3	43.5	42.7	43.8	44.9	47.1	48.3	50.0	55.6	54.9	54.5	52.4	51.4	54.5	52.4	52.3	54.4	53.0	54.7
Man	4.1	4.4	5.4	4.2	4.1	4.5	4.4	4.1	3.8	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8
Sask	1.8	2.5	2.5	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	.9	1.0	.9	.8	.8
Alta	11.4	11.4	13.2	15.0	14.8	12.0	12.1	10.7	9.7	7.9	8.7	8.5	8.8	7.3	7.0	7.2	8.0	6.7	6.2	6.0
B C	14.3	14.8	17.1	17.1	15.7	16.2	14.9	14.5	12.6	12.4	14.3	13.2	13.2	13.8	14.5	17.8	21.9	20.9	23.0	22.0
Total	86	112	143	129	121	89	89	85	100	153	163	193	218	233	255	257	224	213	226	216

Table A-2. Unemployment rate by region, 1975-98

	b c	ont	alta	que	man/sask	atl	can
1975	8.5	6.3	4.1	8.0	3.8	9.8	6.9
1976	8.6	6.2	4.0	8.7	4.3	10.7	7.1
1977	8.5	7.0	4.6	10.3	5.2	12.6	8.1
1978	8.2	7.2	4.7	10.9	5.7	12.5	8.3
1979	7.7	6.5	3.9	9.6	4.8	11.6	7.4
1980	6.8	6.8	3.8	9.8	5.0	11.1	7.5
1981	6.7	6.5	3.8	10.3	5.3	11.6	7.5
1982	12.1	9.8	7.7	13.8	7.3	14.2	11.0
1983	13.8	10.4	10.6	13.9	8.4	15.1	11.8
1984	14.7	9.0	11.0	12.8	8.2	15.2	11.2
1985	14.1	8.0	10.0	11.8	8.2	15.7	10.5
1986	12.5	7.0	9.8	11.0	7.6	14.8	9.5
1987	11.9	6.1	9.5	10.3	7.4	13.8	8.8
1988	10.3	5.0	8.0	9.4	7.6	12.4	7.8
1989	9.1	5.1	7.2	9.3	7.4	12.3	7.5
1990	8.2	6.3	7.0	10.1	7.1	12.8	8.1
1991	9.9	9.6	8.2	11.9	8.0	14.0	10.3
1992	10.4	10.8	9.5	12.8	9.0	14.9	11.3
1993	9.7	10.6	9.7	13.2	8.7	15.4	11.2
1994	9.4	9.6	8.6	12.2	8.2	14.9	11.2
1995	9.0	8.7	7.8	11.3	7.2	13.5	9.4
1996	8.9	9.1	7.0	11.8	7.1	14.0	9.7
1997	8.7	8.5	6.0	11.4	6.3	14.1	9.2
1998	8.9	7.2	5.7	10.4	5.7	13.0	8.4

Table A-3. Level of education by region and year in "too much immigration" (Environics) surveys.

	1981	1983	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	1981-98
b c	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4
ont	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.3
alt	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4
que	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2
m s	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.2
atl	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.2
can	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.3

f-values: region (5) = 23.59***; year (11) = 35.13***; region by year (55) = 2.51***.

Table A-4. Level of education by region and year in "too few, too many" surveys.

	1988	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1988-98
b c	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7
ont	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7
alta	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6
que	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.6
m&s	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5
atl	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.4
can	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.6

f-values: region (5) = 41.75***; survey (9) = 36.14***; r x s (45) = 2.78***

Table A-5. Age by region and year in "too much immigration" surveys.

	1981	1983	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	1981-98
b c	43.8	40.0	44.6	45.1	44.6	43.6	45.1	43.8	44.3	44.6	45.8	45.0	44.4
ont	42.4	42.1	42.6	42.1	42.3	42.7	42.5	42.8	42.3	43.7	43.6	43.9	42.8
alta	41.0	40.3	39.8	38.1	41.0	41.1	41.4	41.5	40.2	42.5	43.8	42.8	41.1
que	40.4	41.9	41.8	42.6	42.0	41.7	42.7	41.6	41.7	44.2	44.9	44.6	42.4
mēs	44.6	42.3	47.2	44.2	44.5	45.1	43.5	44.6	45.0	44.6	45.3	44.7	44.6
atl	42.8	40.9	41.4	42.0	41.7	42.5	42.9	41.1	41.3	42.8	44.6	43.3	42.3
can	42.1	41.6	42.6	42.4	42.6	42.6	42.9	42.5	42.3	43.8	44.5	44.2	42.8

f-values: region (5) = 16.36***; survey (11) = 4.75***; r x s (55) = .79.

Table A-6. Age by region and year in "too few, too many" surveys.

	1988	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1988-98
b c	42.3	43.7	41.7	41.2	45.7	43.7	45.4	45.6	44.7	46.2	44.5
ont	40.6	40.8	41.6	41.4	41.7	41.4	45.5	43.0	43.4	44.1	42.9
alta	40.5	37.9	41.7	38.9	44.9	42.4	43.6	41.9	43.2	44.1	42.2
que	40.1	40.2	39.3	38.6	42.4	42.1	44.0	41.1	43.5	42.8	41.7
m&s	41.2	42.2	44.4	43.2	46.6	43.1	47.2	43.0	43.5	46.2	44.2
atl	41.9	42.6	43.4	40.2	41.4	42.3	44.9	42.3	43.4	44.8	43.0
can	40.8	41.0	41.4	40.5	43.1	42.4	45.0	42.7	43.6	44.3	42.9

f-values: region (5) = 24.74***; survey (9) = 33.40***; r x s (45) = 1.54**

Table A-7. Beta values predicting the "too much immigration" measure of levels policy support from gender, age, level of education, and regional rates of unemployment and immigration flow in Environics surveys from 1981 to 1998.

	1981	1983	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	all
r	.26	.24	.27	.34	.26	.26	.26	.27	.30	.33	.31	.28	.28
df	1824	1897	2013	1959	1996	1967	1955	1994	1971	1966	1973	2185	23765
sex	-.01	-.04t	-.05*	-.08***	-.03	-.04*	-.08***	-.05*	-.06**	-.06**	-.05*	-.02	-.05***
age	.06**	.07**	.05*	.03	.04	.04*	.05*	.02	.06**	-.06**	-.02	.02	.03***
educ.	.27***	.24***	.27***	.33***	.26***	.25***	.25***	.27***	.30***	.31***	.29***	.28***	.28***
unemp.	-.05	-.01	-.05t	-.06t	-.09*	-.05	.04	.04	.04	.00	-.04	-.05*	-.06***
flow	-.07	-.06*	-.04	.01	-.10*	.01	.08*	.01	.04	-.03	-.05*	-.05*	-.03***

Table A-8. Beta values predicting the "too few, too many" measure of levels policy support from gender, age, level of education, and regional rates of unemployment and immigration flow in surveys from 1988 to 1998.

	1988	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	all
r	.28	.23	.30	.28	.26	.23	.23	.23	.27	.24	.24
df	1480	2975	1485	2807	1211	3102	3657	4471	2971	7603	31816
sex	-.10***	-.05**	-.12***	-.07***	-.03	.06***	-.06***	-.07***	-.10***	-.09***	-.06***
age	.10***	.07***	.11***	-.04*	-.06*	-.04*	.00	-.07***	-.01	-.03*	-.02***
educ.	.26***	.23***	.27***	.24***	.21***	.19***	.22***	.19***	.23***	.20***	.21***
unemp.	-.15**	-.06t	.03	.05*	-.02	.03	-.02	.01	.01	-.01	-.04***
flow	-.11*	-.08*	.05	-.07***	-.13***	-.08***	-.06***	-.07***	-.09***	-.10***	-.10***

Table A-9. Beta values of sex, age, education, unemployment rate and regional per capita immigration flow as predictors of levels policy support in "too much immigration" (Environics) surveys, by respondent birthplace.

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	all
cdn-born											
r	.26	.35	.29	.27	.27	.25	.30	.32	.33	.29	.28
sex	-.03	-.06**	-.02	-.02	-.10***	-.05*	-.06**	-.06**	-.03	-.01	-.04***
age	.05*	.04t	.04t	.03	.06**	.03	.06**	-.07**	-.01	.02	.03***
education	.26***	.35***	.29***	.27***	.26***	.26***	.30***	.29***	.32***	.29***	.28***
unemp. rate	-.06t	-.04	-.08t	-.04	.03	.02	.04t	-.01	-.03	-.05*	-.05***
flow	-.07*	.00	-.13**	-.01	.04	-.04	.02	-.05t	-.07**	-.07**	-.05***
correlation with flow	-.03	.03	-.05*	.02	.03	-.04	.01	-.02	-.04t	-.01	-.01
(n)	(1701)	(1684)	(1707)	(1633)	(1672)	(1709)	(1685)	(1674)	(1672)	(1849)	(20661)
foreign-born											
r	.34	.32	.26	.21	.21	.40	.28	.42	.29	.26	.27
sex	-.12*	-.14**	-.09t	-.11*	.04	.01	-.04	.01	-.17**	-.05	-.06***
age	-.13*	-.12*	-.13*	-.06	-.10t	-.19***	-.05	-.14**	-.17**	-.09t	-.11***
education	.25***	.18**	.13*	.14**	.15**	.26***	.26***	.32***	.12*	.16**	.20***
unemp. rate	-.02	-.24**	-.20*	-.12	.11	.14**	.02	.09	-.04	.01	-.07***
flow	-.02	-.13	-.20*	-.08	.10	.05	.06	-.08	-.11t	-.15**	-.05**
correlation with flow	-.02	.02	-.07	.00	.01	-.04	.06	-.16**	-.11t	-.17**	-.04*
(n)	(331)	(309)	(325)	(362)	(319)	(304)	(309)	(307)	(319)	(350)	(3295)

Table A-10. Beta values of sex, age, education, unemployment rate and regional per capita immigration flow as predictors of levels policy support in "too few, too many" surveys, by respondent birthplace.

	1988	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1997	1998	all
cdn-born									
r	.26	.23	.31	.29	.26	.26	.27	.25	.26
sex	-.08**	-.05*	-.13***	-.05**	-.02	.09***	-.12***	-.09***	-.05***
age	.08**	.05*	.12***	-.04t	-.06t	-.02	.01	-.03t	-.01
education	.24***	.23***	.27***	.26***	.22***	.21***	.23***	.20***	.22***
unemp. rate	-.16**	-.04	.05	.05*	-.01	.01	.01	-.01	-.05***
flow	-.14**	-.04	.06	-.09***	-.12***	-.12***	-.08**	-.13***	-.13***
correlation with flow	.01	.00	.03	-.10***	-.10***	-.11***	-.05t	-.11***	-.10***
(n)	(1296)	(1280)	(1286)	(2869)	(1032)	(2293)	(1269)	(4053)	(15379)
foreign-born									
r	.34	.28	.27	.28	.34	.32	.24	.26	.29
sex	-.17**	-.10	-.08	-.11**	-.08	.07	-.07	-.13***	-.10***
age	.01	.07	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.14**	.06	-.09*	-.08***
education	.28***	.18**	.22**	.13**	.12t	.11*	.18**	.09*	.13***
unemp. rate	-.19	-.31**	.04	.07t	.02	-.01	.01	-.08*	-.06***
flow	-.14	-.33**	-.07	-.12**	-.24***	-.26***	-.14*	-.17***	-.21***
correlation with flow	.00	-.09	-.11	-.12***	-.24***	-.24***	-.14*	-.16***	-.20***
(n)	(211)	(212)	(209)	(722)	(226)	(339)	(238)	(638)	(2795)

Table A-11. Beta values of sex, age, education, unemployment rate and regional per capita immigration flow as predictors of acceptance of "non-white" immigration (Environics surveys).

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	all
r	.18	.18	.24	.21	.24	.22	.20	.20
sex	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.03	.03	.07***	.02*
age	-.07**	-.09***	-.12***	-.10***	-.13***	-.11***	-.04*	-.09***
education	.15***	.13***	.18***	.15***	.15***	.15***	.15***	.16***
unemp. rate	.04	-.03	-.07**	-.08***	-.07**	-.08***	-.07**	.01
flow	.01	-.04	-.07**	-.05*	.04	-.03	.02	.03**
correlation with flow	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.01	.08***	.01	.06**	.03***
(n)	(1997)	(1996)	(2014)	(1997)	(1985)	(1991)	(2199)	(14179)

Table A-12. Factor matrix for performance ratings of immigration program areas -- Angus Reid 1998 and 1999 surveys.

	factor loading	
	I	II
Based on what you have read, seen or heard, how would you rate the performance of our immigration program at ...		
"Protect residents" factor:		
keeping criminals from coming here as refugees?	.8	-.4
keeping criminals from coming here as immigrants?	.8	-.4
making sure those whose refugee claims are rejected are deported quickly?	.7	-.3
making sure people keep their promise to support their family members who immigrate here?	.7	.0
making sure new immigrants are in good health when they come here?	.7	-.1
handling refugee claims made by people who have come to Canada?	.6	.4
selecting workers with the right skills to find jobs when they get here?	.6	.1
admitting temporary workers only when there are not enough Canadians with those kinds of skills?	.5	.2
"Help immigrants" factor:		
letting people in refugee camps overseas come to Canada?	.5	.6
helping immigrants bring their families here?	.4	.7
eigenvalue	3.9	1.3
% of variance	39.3	13.3

Table A-13. Levels policy support and perceived effects on employment, culture and the community, by region and pairs of surveys from January 1996 to October 1998 (Angus Reid surveys).

region	jan & jul 96		sep 96 jan 97		jun 97 jan 98		mar & jun 98		jul & oct 98	all	
levels policy support											
toronto	2.9		3.0		3.2		3.0	*	3.3	3.1	***
vancouver	3.0	*	2.6		2.8		2.9		3.0	2.9	
montreal	2.9	*	3.1		3.2		3.2	*	3.5	3.2	***
alta urban	3.0		3.1		3.2		3.1		3.3	3.1	*
ont urban	2.9		2.8	t	3.0		2.9	t	3.1	2.9	t
ont rural	2.8		2.7	***	3.1	**	2.7		2.9	2.8	
b c rural	2.8		2.7		2.8		2.9		2.7	2.8	
other	3.0		3.0		3.0	*	3.2	t	3.3	3.1	***
canada	2.93		2.94	**	3.06		3.06	***	3.22	3.04	***
effect on employment											
toronto	2.5	t	2.6		2.7		2.6		2.8	2.7	**
vancouver	2.7		2.7		2.8		2.7		2.7	2.7	
montreal	2.3	***	2.6		2.7		2.6		2.6	2.6	***
alta urban	2.4	t	2.6		2.7		2.6		2.6	2.6	t
ont urban	2.4		2.5		2.4	t	2.6		2.6	2.5	*
ont rural	2.4		2.4		2.5		2.4		2.5	2.4	
b c rural	2.4		2.5		2.6		2.6		2.4	2.5	
other	2.5	t	2.6		2.5		2.5		2.6	2.5	**
canada	2.45	***	2.56		2.58		2.58		2.63	2.56	***

Note. Asterisks between columns represent tests of the difference from the results of the previous pairs of surveys. To the right of the final column, they test differences between the first and last survey pairs.

Table A-13 (cont'd.). Levels policy support and perceived effects on employment, culture and the community, by region and pairs of surveys from January 1996 to October 1998 (Angus Reid surveys).

region	jan & jul 96	sep 96 jan 97	jun 97 jan 98		mar & jun 98		jul & oct 98	all	
effect on culture									
toronto	3.4	3.5	3.4		3.5	*	3.7	3.5	
vancouver	3.5	3.4	3.4		3.3		3.3	3.4	***
montreal	3.1	3.2	3.2		3.1	t	3.3	3.2	t
alta urban	3.3	3.5	3.6		3.4		3.5	3.5	
ont urban	3.3	3.2	3.3		3.3		3.4	3.3	
ont rural	3.2	3.1	3.2		3.2		3.3	3.2	
b c rural	3.3	3.1	3.3		3.3		3.2	3.2	
other	3.2	3.2	3.2		3.2		3.3	3.2	
canada	3.26	3.25	3.29		3.28	**	3.36	3.29	**
effect on community									
toronto			3.4	t	3.3	**	3.5	3.4	
vancouver			3.3		3.2		3.2	3.2	
montreal			3.4		3.4		3.4	3.4	
alta urban			3.5		3.4		3.4	3.4	
ont urban			3.2		3.3	t	3.4	3.3	*
ont rural			3.2		3.1	**	3.3	3.2	
b c rural			3.3		3.3		3.2	3.2	
other			3.3		3.2	**	3.4	3.3	
canada			3.32	*	3.26	***	3.38	3.32	*

Note. Asterisks between columns represent tests of the difference from the results of the previous pairs of surveys. To the right of the final column, they test differences between the first and last survey pairs.

Table A-14. Per cent of interviews by birthplace of respondent and interviewer -- Toronto and Vancouver (Environics October 1998).

	interviewer			
respondent	canada	other	all	(n)
toronto				
canada	78.9	35.9	69.2	(119)
other	21.1	64.1	30.8	(53)
all	77.3	22.7	100.0	
(n)	(133)	(39)		(172)
vancouver				
canada	62.1	60.6	61.6	(188)
other	37.9	39.4	38.4	(117)
all	69.2	30.8	100.0	
(n)	(211)	(94)		(305)

Note. Chi-squared: Toronto = 26.22, $p < .00001$; Vancouver = .06, n.s.

Table A-15. Regressions predicting levels policy support from regional per capita immigration flow in Gallup surveys between 1975 and 1989, controlling for gender, age, education and regional unemployment.

	1975	1980	1982	1985	1987	1988	1989	all
r	.23	.18	.19	.16	.24	.24	.20	.17
df	1024	1033	1024	1007	991	1020	998	6103
sex	-.06*	-.05	-.02	-.04	-.10**	-.04	-.04	-.04***
age	.02	.08**	-.03	.01	.10***	.09**	.09**	.06***
educ	.09**	.13***	.06t	.13***	.22***	.22***	.17***	.16***
unemp	-.01	-.12*	.01	-.06	-.07	-.13**	-.09	-.10***
flow	-.21***	-.22***	-.17***	-.13**	-.04	-.05	-.02	-.06**

Table A-16. Per cent displaying ingroup favouritism relative to immigrants from the caribbean, south asia and china, by region, regional per capita presence of those groups (in parentheses) -- 1991 Angus Reid survey.

	caribbean	south asia	china	[n]
toronto	52 (3.58)	65 (3.08)	42 (4.34)	[454]
vancouver	38 (.35)	52 (2.46)	33 (7.78)	[476]
montreal	53 (1.86)	72 (.64)	41 (.70)	[464]
alta urban	41 (.51)	57 (1.16)	32 (2.45)	[128]
ont urban	41 (.67)	59 (.59)	32 (.70)	[285]
ont rural	50 (.13)	67 (.18)	42 (.21)	[263]
b.c. rural	41 (.06)	55 (1.10)	36 (.38)	[109]
other	44 (.12)	65 (.16)	39 (.26)	[956]
canada	45 (.92)	63 (1.52)	38 (.93)	[3135]
f	5.26***	7.96***	2.51**	

Note. Presence data from 1991 Statistics Canada census. Respondents were asked "I would like you to think of recent immigrants to Canada. These are persons born and raised outside of Canada. How comfortable would you feel being around individuals from the following groups of immigrants? ... West Indian Blacks? Chinese? Indo-Pakistanis? and Sikhs?" South Asian category combines responses to "Indo-Pakistanis" and "Sikhs". Sample sizes for "Chinese" are very slightly smaller (99%). Ingroup favouritism equals expressing greater comfort about being with member of respondent's own ethnic group than with member of target group.

Table A-17. Beta values predicting ingroup favouritism relative to immigrants from the caribbean, south asia and china from regional per capita presence, controlling for gender, age, education and regional unemployment -- 1991 Angus Reid survey.

	caribbean	south asia	china
r	.17	.16	.10
df res	(3129)	(3129)	(3088)
gender	-.10***	-.04*	-.06***
age	.13***	.10***	.06**
education	.03*	.02	.03
unemployment	.04*	.01	-.03
presence	.08***	-.12***	-.08***

Note. Presence data from 1991 Statistics Canada census.
Respondents were asked "I would like you to think of recent immigrants to Canada. These are persons born and raised outside of Canada. How comfortable would you feel being around individuals from the following groups of immigrants? ... West Indian Blacks? Chinese? Indo-Pakistanis? and Sikhs?" South Asian category combines responses to "Indo-Pakistanis" and "Sikhs".
Ingroup favouritism equals expressing greater comfort about being with member of respondent's own ethnic group than with member of target group.